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Introduction
Consider the pair of choices between gambles below (Figure 1). A majority prefers gamble f  
that yields $3000 with certainty to gamble g  that yields $4000 with 0.8 probability (else noth­
ing) in the left hand choice. Simultaneously, a majority prefers gamble g ' that yields $4000 
with 0.2 probability (else nothing) to gamble f '  that yields $3000 with 0.25 probability (else 
nothing) in the right hand choice (respectively 80% and 65%; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Figure 1. Common ratio paradox. Squares are choice nodes where you decide to go up or down. Circles are 
chance nodes where chance decides with the specified probabilities. Arrows indicate common preferences.
This example illustrates several aspects of decision theory. First, it exemplifies the behavior of 
interest in this thesis: individual choice between monetary gambles. Second, the combination of 
choices is interesting because it is widespread and appears reasonable, but constitutes a viola­
tion of the sure-thing principle (as will be shown below), an axiom of rational decision making 
embodied in expected utility theory (EU). Therefore, this example illustrates that in describing 
ordinary choice a model is needed that deviates from EU. This introduction presents EU, its 
normative merit, and how it has led to current descriptive theories of choice with which this 
thesis is concerned.
1. Expected Utility
The interest of mathematicians in the 17th century in games of chance led to the first recogniz­
able decision theory (cf. David, 1962) that, in a choice among gambles, the one with the high­
est expected value should be chosen. Soon, it became apparent that this theory is normatively 
questionable. Nicholas Bernoulli asked what the fair price should be for the St. Petersburg 
game, that pays $2i with probability 2i. Sensible people do not offer just any amount of 
money to play this game, although it has an infinite expected value. Besides the fact that no one 
can honestly offer this game for a lack of sufficient prize money (cf. Shapley, 1977), the main 
historic reason that has been offered is that the possible enormous quantities of money that 
might be won do not really add 'utility': "..mathematicians evaluate money in proportion to its 
quantity while, in practice, people with common sense evaluate money in proportion to the util­
ity they can obtain from it." (Cramer, 1728). Illustrated more simply, a decision maker (DM) of 
moderate wealth may be well advised to prefer $9M for sure to a gamble that offers a 0.5 prob-
3
Chapter 1
ability of winning $20M, contrary to expected value maximization (Bernoulli, 1738); the addi­
tional utility of $11M when you already gained $9M is not worth the risk of gaining nothing. 
Classic utility theory therefore proposes that expected utility should be maximized and that the 
utility of money is marginally decreasing.
EU as a decision theory was not advanced substantially until von Neumann and Morgen­
stern (1944) provided the first axiomatization of EU. That is, they provided a set of axioms on 
preferences that, if  obeyed, ensures that a utility exists such that if  gamble f  is preferred to 
gamble g  then the expected utility of gamble f  exceeds the expected utility of gamble g  (and vice 
versa). An axiomatization of EU can be given by i) completeness, ii) transitivity, iii) continuity, 
and iv) the sure-thingprinciple (Savage, 1954). The first three axioms are widely accepted. The 
axiom that is of main interest here is the sure-thing principle, which entails that for a choice 
between gambles f  and g  only events should matter for which f  and g  yield different amounts. 
Events for which both gambles yield identical amounts are irrelevant for preference, which 
therefore should be invariant when these amounts are changed.
Besides characterizing EU precisely in terms of observable behavior, the axiomatization 
also provides new ways to test the normative appeal of EU. Previously, the question why EU 
should be maximized relied on prima facie plausibility (Cramer, 1728; Bernoulli, 1738). With 
the axiomatization of EU, new and more compelling intuitions become available: if  EU is vio­
lated, one of its axioms must be violated. Because the axioms are normatively appealing this 
may be an indication that, on second thought, a preference violating EU (such as illustrated in 
Figure 1) must be mistaken (Savage, 1954, p. 103). Alternatively, it may be an indication that 
at least one of the axioms is not normatively appealing (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961). There is 
no final criterion against which to decide rational disputes, but as Goodman (1965, p. 54) ar­
gues concerning the justification of the axioms of deductive inference: "A rule is amended if it 
yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are 
unwilling to amend. The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjust­
ments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the agreement achieved lies the only justifi­
cation needed for either." The intuitive appeal of the sure-thing principle can probably be made 
explicit when it is decomposed in a dynamic context as has been done in the boxed elaboration 
on the next page.
2. Prospect Theory
During the 1970s, cognitive psychologists revealed that many normative principles are sys­
tematically violated in cognitive tasks such as judgment and decision making (cf. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). This led to the view that people regu­
larly employ (quick but dirty heuristics, which usually lead to correct results but may lead to 
biases when applied in some domains or situations (cf. Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The view of 
EU as an adequate descriptive theory became implausible.
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Probably the most appealing defense of the STP can be given 
using dynamic principles. The present discussion is based on 
the presentation of Wakker (1999) and originates indepen­
dently from Burks (1977) and Hammond (1988). Each dyna­
mic principles insist that choices should be in the same direc­
tion (up or down) between the two consecutive boxes; the 
preference pattern of Figure 1 (first and final boxes) therefore 
implies that at least one principle is violated.
Foregone-event independence entails that outcomes of 
forgone events in the past should not affect present decisions. 
The assumption is that no relevant part (besides, perhaps, 
psychologically) of the decision of the first box is altered in 
the second. So in this instance, if it is disclosed (or not) that 
there was only a 1/4 probability that the DM would get the 
opportunity of the first box, the disclosure of this 'history' 
should not affect the preference between Zand g.
Dynamic consistency entails that if a choice between f  and 
g has to be 'committed to' before nature decides whether the 
DM will be presented with this opportunity, the DM should 
not change this commitment after nature has decided. The ra­
tionale is that because no relevant part is altered, the DM can 
reason beforehand how the choice-situation will be and de­
cide what he will choose if the opportunity presents itself.
Context independence entails that the way a decision tree 
is presented should not affect preference. That is, both boxes 
are identical except changing the order of the chance and 
choice nodes, to which the DM has committed himself before­
hand.
Reduction of compound lotteries entails that if two gam­
bles feature identical probability distributions over final con­
sequences they should be treated as the same. In this instance, 
receiving $4000 dependent on a probability device that has 
two stages that must both be successful (the first with a prob­
ability of 0.25, the second with a probability of 0.8) should be 
treated the same as receiving $4000 dependent on a device 
that has one stage that is successful with a probability of 0.2. 
(As a matter of fact, the device could be identical in both 
boxes, with the subject only knowing the final outcome in the 
last box.)
If all these principles are satisfied the sure-thing principle 
is entailed. For a detailed analysis, see Wakker (1999).
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Prospect Theory (PT; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) combined the perspective of choice as 
a psychological task with a mathematical form that stayed close to EU. PT adopts a value func­
tion v that models the psychological evaluation of money. Emphasizing that subjects also have 
to evaluate the riskiness of gambles, a separate decision weight function n  is introduced 
(Edwards, 1954a) that transforms probabilities to model a psychological attitude towards risk. 
Although psychological aspects enter decision making with PT, it also stays close to EU, be­
cause the PT value of gambles is taken to represent preference. That is, PT does not describe 
the process of choice but provides a mathematical model for choice behavior. So even if the 
shapes of the value and weighting functions are inspired on psychological aspects of the choice 
task, in the end the most important test of PT is how well choice is predicted, not how well its 
functions can be interpreted.
Figure 2. Typical value- (left) and weighting functions (right) of PT.
In modeling the evaluation of amounts of money, the value function (Figure 2) reflects 
several psychological characteristics. Central is a reference point (Markowitz, 1952), usually 
the status quo, that allows framing of amounts as gains or losses. This distinction is natural, 
but also essential for PT because gains and losses are evaluated differently. First, losing some 
amount is more displeasurable than gaining the same amount is pleasurable (loss aversion), 
which is modeled by the value being steeper for losses than for gains. The shape of the value 
function is further determined by diminishing sensitivity, a phenomenon that is well known in 
psychophysics. Diminishing sensitivity is the property of human perception that it is more dis­
criminative near a natural reference point than farther away from it. Applied to the perception of 
numbers representing monetary outcomes, the difference between $10 and $20 is perceived as 
larger than the difference between $110 and $120, even though it is $10 in both cases. Note 
that this principle has nothing to do with the utility of money; it is just a characteristic of the 
process involved. Diminishing sensitivity results in a concave value when applied to gains and 
a convex value when applied to losses, which (being opposite) enhances the importance of the 
reference point further.
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PT introduces probability distortions by a decision weight function n that transforms fixed 
probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) hypothesize a weighting function that over­
weights small probabilities and underweights moderate and large probabilities (Figure 2). Near 
the endpoints decision weights are not defined, which reflects that unlikely events are either ig­
nored entirely or overweighted, depending on the situation. Although this function is primarily 
inspired on empirical results, the way probability is distorted can be regarded as another in­
stance of diminishing sensitivity. In the case of probability there are two natural reference 
points, impossibility and certainty. A change from impossibility to possibility has a large im­
pact, which results in an overweighting of small probabilities. A change from a certain conse­
quence to a consequence that is merely probable (introducing risk) also receives a large impact 
(the certainty effect), which results in underweighting of large probabilities. Thus PT models 
gambling (insurance) behavior and, simultaneously, a general tendency to be risk averse for 
gains (risk seeking for losses) (fourfold pattern; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
3. Development of rank-dependent utility theory
Whereas in PT fixed probabilities are transformed, rank-dependent theories (RDU; Quiggin, 
1982; Schmeidler, 1989) transform decumulative probabilities, i.e. the probability of receiving 
an amount of money or more. In contrast with the transformation of fixed probabilities in PT, 
rank-dependent transformations do not lead to violations of dominance and can be plausibly 
extended to prospects with any number of outcomes. Furthermore, rank-dependent theories can 
be axiomatized by relaxing the sure-thing principle while retaining the other axioms (Wakker, 
1996). Also, they allow modeling of risk attitude by choosing the appropriate weighting func­
tion in a more intuitive way. Consider for example the rank-dependent evaluation of a gamble f  
that yields $100 with probability 0.1 and $25 with probability 0.4, else nothing. If the proba­
bilities of receiving an outcome are treated as intervals along the x-axis, rank-ordered according 
to the outcomes, decision weights are then derived by the differences between the end- and be­
gin points of the corresponding intervals defined by the weighting function W (Figure 3). The 
RDU value of a gamble (that is compared to the RDU value of other gambles to represent pref­
erence) is obtained by summing the products of the values of the consequences with the corre­
sponding decision weights. If an inverse S-shaped weighting function is assumed (Figure 3; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), the best and worst outcomes are overweighted and middle out­
comes will be underweighted. This leads, for example, to the prediction that gamble fw ill be 
preferred to its expected value ($20) for sure. It can easily be seen that in modeling risk attitude 
with RDU, a concave weighting function intuitively models optimistic decision behavior (best 
events receive largest weights) whereas a convex weighting function similarly models pes­
simistic decision behavior (worst events receive largest weights). Inverse S-shaped weighting 
functions reflect diminishing sensitivity and may model the fourfold pattern.
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Figure 3. Inverse S-shaped weighting function reflecting diminishing sensitivity.
An inverse S-shaped weighting function also quite naturally predicts commonly observed 
violations of the sure-thing principle, as exemplified in Figure 1. The underweighting of the 
probability of 0.8 to win $4000 in g  with the simultaneous overweighting of the 0.2 probability 
to win $4000 in g '  explains the commonly observed preferences. Therefore, rank-dependent 
weighting of utilities models psychological characteristics of choice as was done in PT, while 
being a mathematically elegant generalization of EU by relaxing the sure-thing principle.
4. Methodological issues and empirical results
Although PT and RDU introduce psychological features into decision making, the bottom line 
for descriptive theories remains in how well the theory can describe preferences. Some features 
of PT (reference point, loss aversion) are well-established, but concerning the distortion of 
probabilities, the empirical evaluation of PT and RDU is not as simple as it might seem. Before 
turning to experimental evidence, some methodological issues need to be addressed.
The first issue is that the ultimate test is not entirely empirical nor objective because a 
tradeoff has to be made between the parsimony of the model and its predictive power. RDU, 
for example, generalizes EU and therefore will describe preferences at least as well as EU does. 
To become the preferred descriptive theory, RDU has to model behavior that deviates systemat­
ically and sufficiently from EU.
A second issue concerns the use of incentives. For example, the common ratio paradox 
(Figure 1) was deemed paradoxical because many subjects reveal that they would choose in­
compatible with EU i/these gambles were offered. The question remains if the choices would 
still be paradoxical if  the gambles were indeed offered. Especially economists have raised the 
objection that without real incentives, revealed preferences may differ systematically from pref-
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erences when choices are for real. Fortunately, this question can be solved empirically and it 
appears that except for some small differences (e.g., subjects tend to be more risk averse for 
real gain choices), responses are very similar for risky choice (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). In 
particular, paradoxical behavior is rarely reduced significantly by using real incentives.
The root of many methodological problems is that preference is a psychological process 
that can be primarily characterized as 'constructive' (cf. Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1992). 
That does not necessarily imply that choice is noisy, which it actually is (for example, about 25 
to 35% of preferences are reversed in strict replications interspersed in the same trial; Camerer, 
1995). Rather, it implies a lack of robustness of preferences, i.e. preferences depend on many 
factors. Phenomena that both illustrate preference as a constructive process and introduce 
methodological problems are violations of procedure and presentation invariance (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). That is, it can be shown that preferences depend on the method of elicitation 
(cf. Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983) and on the manner in which choice problems are presented 
(e.g. framing effects; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Experimentally, the constructive nature of preferences creates an immediate methodologi­
cal problem concerning the selection of a between- or within- subjects design to test descriptive 
models. Because choice models assume that a single DM is characterized by some parameters 
(e.g. a value and a weighting function in case of RDU), a within subjects design seems to be 
most suitable. However, to generate sufficient data in order to test descriptive theories, a sub­
stantial number of questions is required. Because preference is not a fixed routine but a con­
structive process, a DM knowing that several choices have to be made, inevitably generates a 
heuristic to facilitate this task. Therefore, within subjects designs risk studying a heuristic de­
veloped during a laboratory task, which is probably not what decision theory intends to study.
Whereas between subjects designs do not (necessarily) introduce the generation of heuris­
tics, these designs face methodological problems testing descriptive models in that individual 
variation must be allowed for. For example, aggregate data may very well fail to provide evi­
dence for rank-dependent weighting, while all DMs maximize some RDU value but use differ­
ent weighting functions (e.g. optimistic, pessimistic or inverse S-shaped). Probably the most 
fruitful view drops attention for individual variation but regards properties of choice behavior 
that are exhibited by 'everyman'.
Many tests with various methodological strengths and weaknesses have been carried out 
by now (cf. Camerer, 1995). If behavior shows significant and systematic tendencies that can 
be captured by rank-dependent probability transformation, this would be revealed in a cross 
section of the many empirical studies done so far despite methodological difficulties. One phe­
nomenon that is well established is the certainty effect. Interestingly, this effect also explains 
revealed violations of the sure-thing principle in common ratio paradoxes by rats (Kagel, 
Battalio & Green, 1995). Because in these experiments probabilities are linked to actual fre­
quencies, not to a symbolic representation thereof, it is suggested that the certainty effect is not 
the result of some perceptual bias but of some intrinsic aversion to risk. Besides the certainty
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effect, the overweighting of small probabilities is also well established (cf. Camerer, 1995). 
Both effects can be modeled quite elegantly by rank-dependent models with a inverse S-shaped 
weighting function.
Experiments testing the suggested inverse S-shaped weighting function illustrate that no 
strong systematic tendencies appear other than through the effects mentioned. Most experi­
ments report evidence supporting the inverted S-shape (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer
& Ho, 1994; Abdellaoui, 1998; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999), but it must be noted that both over­
weighting of small probabilities and the certainty effect favor this shape. Some experiments re­
port evidence for the opposite, S-shaped weighting function (Birnbaum & Veira, 1998). 
Experiments that are only sensitive to the precise difference between EU and RDU show no 
improvement (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994; Chapter 4) or a slight improvement when rank- 
dependent evaluation is facilitated with the presentation of stimuli (Weber & Kirsner, 1997). 
Experiments testing the predictive strength of various models typically report only a slight im­
provement of EU by RDU (Hey & Orme, 1994; Hartinger, 1999), although RDU shows most 
promise compared to other alternative models (cf. Camerer, 1995). The assumption that sub­
jects do not distort probabilities is not plausible at all (i.e. EU is systematically violated), how­
ever, the tendencies in how probabilities are distorted are not that systematic with the notable 
exception of the certainty effect and the overweighting of small probabilities.
5. Preview
Central in this thesis is the non-linear weighting of probabilities as a means to modeling prefer­
ences between monetary gambles. Chapter 2 introduces an axiomatization of a rank-dependent 
model that allows the overweighting of small decumulative probabilities on a range [0,p], 
which models the popularity of typical long shot gambles, while simultaneously allowing for 
the underweighting of moderate to large probabilities on the range [p,1], which models the 
certainty effect and a general aversion to risk. The resulting inverse S-shaped weighting func­
tion, reflecting diminishing sensitivity, yields a model that explains typical characteristics of 
popular lotteries that cannot be explained by EU. The restriction of over- and underweighting to 
prespecified ranges has been relaxed in subsequent axiomatizations of rank-dependent proba­
bility transformation (Wakker & Tversky, 1993). The chapter further discusses the role of util­
ity, loss aversion and scale compatibility in the explanation of the buying of lotteries. One of 
the elements that seems important in gambling, but was omitted, is that lotteries typically will 
have a winner despite the small probability of winning for every ticket. As was observed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it appears that very small probabilities are either overweighted 
or ignored; the knowledge that some ticket will yield the main prize ('so why not mine?') prob­
ably adds to the overweighting of the probability to win in the buying of lotteries.
The third chapter compares the functional form transforming fixed probabilities used in 
original PT with the rank-dependent form of cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1992). It is argued that transforming probabilities in a rank-dependent manner not
10
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only 'corrects' theoretical difficulties concerning dominance but also leads to different predic­
tions. Experimental data reveal that when prospects feature multiple outcomes the rank-depen­
dent transformation of probabilities of cumulative prospect theory (featuring an inverse S- 
shaped weighting function) improves the modeling of preference compared to PT.
Chapters 2 and 3 reveal that the rank-dependent transforming of probabilities shows em­
pirical promise and may replace EU as a descriptive model. However, because the rank-depen­
dent model is a generalization of EU it is trivial that it will yield predictions that are at least as 
well as that of EU. The proper question is whether the tradeoff between degrees of freedom 
and predictive power will be in favor of RDU. To test this hypothesis, chapter 4 presents a 
critical test between RDU and EU based on the precise axiomatic difference between these 
models (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994) in the context of decision making under ambiguity. 
Unfortunately, this test does not yield evidence that RDU adds a significant improvement over 
EU. Also, when probability transformation is restricted to optimistic, pessimistic or inverse S- 
shaped weighting functions, no significant improvement over EU was revealed. This negative 
finding may be due to the way gambles were displayed, enhancing the canceling of common 
outcomes. It appears that in ordinary choices, rank-dependent weighting of probability is not as 
pronounced as anticipated.
On a different track, chapter 5 investigates the shape of the value function for losses in 
risky decision making. Diminishing marginal utility implies that both for losses and gains utility 
should be concave (as money becomes more valuable when you have less), which has been 
generally assumed in the economic literature. Diminishing sensitivity, on the other hand, im­
plies that the value will be convex for losses. Measurements done before show mixed results 
with a majority supporting a convex value. However, these previous measurements mostly as­
sume that probabilities are not distorted, which leads to a bias of the results towards convex 
value functions for losses. The tradeoff method (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) controls for prob­
ability distortion and reveals evidence that the value for losses is convex as hypothesized by 
diminishing sensitivity.
The final chapter investigates the dependence of preference on seemingly inconsequential 
variations in the configuration of gambles. That is, when an event of a gamble is divided into 
several other events yielding similar outcomes as the original the event is said to be spread. 
When an event resulting in a favorable (unfavorable) outcome is spread, this increases 
(decreases) the attractiveness of the gamble (event-spreading effect). It is shown that event- 
spreading can induce alarmingly large rates of violations of about any normative principle. 
Apparently, outcomes are not sufficiently traded off with probability. However, it is also 
shown that this effect is not robust in that it is susceptible to small variations of context and 
presentation.
The overall conclusion of the thesis seems to be very much in line with the conclusion 
drawn by Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 317) introducing cumulative prospect theory.
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Theories of choice are at best approximate and incomplete. One reason for this pessimistic as­
sessment is that choice is a constructive and contingent process. When faced with a complex 
problem, people employ a variety of heuristic procedures in order to simplify the representa­
tion and evaluation of prospects. These procedures include computational shortcuts and editing 
operations, such as eliminating common components and discarding nonessential differences 
(Tversky, 1969). The heuristics of choice do not readily lend themselves to formal analysis be­
cause their application depends on the formulation of the problem, the method of elicitation, 
and the context of choice.
There is reason to be optimistic in that rank-dependent utility models some major systematic 
deviations from EU in a mathematically elegant way (Chapters 2 & 3). Also, some basic psy­
chological factors concerning the perception of numbers can be represented in the value and 
weighting functions (Chapter 5). Thus, RDU may approximate decision behavior quite well. 
However, RDU is just a model and does not describe the actual process of decision making 
which appears to be thoroughly flexible just as other psychological processes. This means that 
decision routines can be applied in many situations but also that these are sensitive to many fac­
tors not covered by formal models (Chapter 6). In this perspective, it appears that the non-lin­
ear evaluation of probabilities is only a moderate factor in choice (Chapter 4) that has the advan­
tage of being easily modeled in generalizations of EU.
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Abstract
Popular lotteries typically give a very small probability to win a large prize and a moderate 
chance to win smaller prizes. In this chapter a rank-dependent model is axiomatized with an S- 
shaped weighting function, capable of giving an account for the popularity of these lotteries. 
Also, the role of utility, loss aversion and scale compatibility in explaining the buying of 
lotteries is discussed.
Fennema, Hein & Peter P. Wakker. (1994). "An Explanation and Characterization for the Buying 
of Lotteries." In Sixtos Rios (Ed.), Decision Making and Decision Analysis: Trends and 
Challenges, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 163-175.
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Characterizing the buying of lotteries
The history of mankind shows that people like to gamble. Gambling, however, has posed 
problems to economic theory. Expected utility theory does not provide the possibility for giving 
a plausible account, as will be explained below. A solution is to question if gambling behavior, 
although systematic, falls under the realm of rational behavior. In this vein, gambling has often 
been explained in non-economic terms, by the enjoyment or the production of adrenaline that 
gambling can give. However, also economic characteristics affect the attractiveness of gambles. 
A typically popular lottery, while actuarially unfair, has two distinctive features: first, it gives a 
very small chance to win a large amount and second, it gives a considerable chance to win a 
small amount or to break even. On the other hand, an actuarially fair fifty-fifty gamble is almost 
always rejected.
This chapter provides an axiomatic model, based on rank-dependent utility theory de­
veloped by Quiggin (1982). The model implies an S-shaped weighting function that gives an 
account of the characteristics of popular lotteries. Besides economic characteristics en­
compassed by the axiomatization, we readily concede that psychological factors play an 
important role. These are discussed in the final section.
1. Explaining the buying of lotteries
Theoretically, gambling is somewhat puzzling. From a broad point of view, expected utility 
does quite a good job at describing decisions under risk, mainly by the assumption of diminish­
ing marginal utility. Under this assumption people are predicted to dislike long shot lotteries 
(gaining a large amount with a small probability), contrary to observed behavior (Shapira & 
Venezia, 1992). The popularity of long shot lotteries becomes even more puzzling if we accept 
the intuitively compelling idea of a reference-point in evaluating gambles (Markowitz, 1952, 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): Empirically it is well established that most people exhibit loss- 
aversion, which implies that the utility is steeper for losses than for gains. But by gambling, 
people do not seem to attach as much importance to the ticket-fee as a steep utility for losses 
would suggest.
Friedman and Savage (1948) also tried to explain the attractiveness of lotteries within an 
expected utility framework. They hypothesize a utility with a convex region, to account for 
risk-seeking behavior.1 When people have an initial wealth located near the first inflection point 
(with the convex region at the right hand side), people are predicted to reject fifty-fifty fair 
gambles but to accept long shot gambles. Still, this hypothesis is not very convincing. The 
predictions are only accurate for a specific range of initial wealths. If wealth is in the convex 
region, subjects are predicted to take fifty-fifty gambles, even if the gambles are actuarially un­
fair to a moderate degree. As Quiggin (1991) points out, the levels of wealth in the convex re­
gion are predicted not to be found in the society, for at these levels people will gamble until 
they reach a level of wealth in one of the concave regions. Although this argument may seem 
contrived, it points at a major weakness of the Friedman-Savage hypothesis. The attractiveness
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of typical lottery formats does not seem to be related to the level of wealth of participants as 
predicted by the Friedman-Savage hypothesis. For more elaborated criticisms, see Machina 
(1982).
A suggestion already given by Edwards (1962) is that not only the attitude towards money 
is important in decision making, but also the attitude towards probability. To explain gambling 
and the buying of insurance simultaneously, it is hypothesized that people are prone to overes­
timate the probability of rare events. For very small probabilities, the probability-distortion ef­
fect could outweigh the relative loss of utility. Also, by assuming underweighting of moderate 
and large probabilities, it is predicted that people dislike actuarially fair gambles with a moder­
ate probability for obtaining the highest outcome.
Although transforming probabilities proves to be an adequate instrument to explain gam­
bling and other kinds of systematic violations of expected utility, it is not easy to model. The 
first model, studied by Edwards and others, violates first order stochastic dominance (see for 
instance Fishburn, 1978 or Wakker, 1989). Only Quiggin (1982) found a proper model for 
using transformed probabilities in decision making, the rank-dependent utility model. Quiggin 
(1991) used this model to explain the features of popular lotteries, through an S-shaped 
weighting function. Such a function had also been proposed by Karni and Safra (1990). A 
typical example is given in Figure 1.
Probability p 
Figure 1. A typical weighting function.
The next section provides an axiomatization of such weighting functions, that predict the over­
weighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of large probabilities. We concentrate 
there on the modeling of probability effects. Utility effects will not be axiomatized; they are dis­
cussed in Section 3.
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2. A characterization of the buying of lotteries
This section derives the characterization of S-shaped weighting functions when utility is linear, 
and is more technical than the other parts of the chapter. We assume that the outcome set is an 
interval [0, M], for a fixed M > 0. Thus we only consider gain outcomes, and sign-dependence 
is not an issue. By P we denote the set of all gambles over the outcomes, i.e., all probability 
distributions over [0, M] that assign probability one to a finite subset of [0, M]. By (x^p^ ...; 
i m,pm) we denote the gamble that with probability p 1 results in outcome x ^  ..., and with 
probability pm in outcome xm. For the study of rank-dependence, the topic of this chapter, it is 
convenient to formulate a mechanism that can generate the randomness, i.e., to assume an un­
derlying state space. We model it through the unit interval, as follows.
Assume that a number is picked at random from [0,1]. For each subinterval A of [0,1], 
the probability P(A ) that the random number is contained in A is the length of A . This 
determines the usual uniform probability distribution over [0,1]. A gamble is generated by a 
random variable f  on [0,1], i.e., f  denotes a mechanism that specifies for each number from 
[0,1] an amount of money obtained when the number in question is the number randomly 
chosen from [0,1] . We use the term act instead of random variable, and the set of acts is 
denoted by F; all acts are assumed measurable and take only a finite number of outcomes. Thus 
each act generates a gamble, and for each gamble acts can be constructed to generate the 
gamble; we identify acts and gambles. Acts can be mixed, in a (pointwise manner, as a  f+  (1- 
a )g  : a  a  a  f(a>) + (1 -a )  g(a). It is important to note that here outcomes are mixed, and not 
probabilities.
Finally, f  denotes the preference relation of a decision maker on the gambles. We assume 
that each act is equivalent to the gamble it generates, thus f  also denotes preferences over acts. 
By f  we denote strict preference, and ~ denotes indifference. We assume throughout that f  is 
complete ( f  f  g  or g f  ffo r all acts f, g) and transitive, i.e., it is a weak order. We further as­
sume that f  satisfies strict stochastic dominance, i.e., if  in (x1,p1;...;xn,pn) any of its out­
comes that occurs with positive probability is increased, the resulting gamble is strictly pre­
ferred. Finally, we assume that f  is continuous in both outcomes and probabilities. So a minor 
change in outcomes, as well as a minor change in probabilities, leads to a minor change in pref­
erence.
A function V : F 0  IR represents f  if, for all acts f, g, 
f  f  g  / V f  V(g).
We say that the rank-dependent utility model holds if there exist a strictly increasing continuous 
weighting function w:[0,1] 0  [0,1] (w(0)=0, w(1)=1), and a utility function u: [0,M ]0 IR  
such that f  is represented by the following form, that is displayed now for the case ^1 ... xn, 
and subsequently defined in general:
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n
(xhp1; ... ;xn,pn) a  ^  n i u(xi).
i=1
i i1
Here n  is the difference w ( -  w(%pj) (which is w(p\) for i=1). If the outcomes are not
ordered as assumed above, then they are first permuted and then a formula as above is applied.
In rank-dependent utility, comonotonicity plays an important role; it was introduced in 
Schmeidler (1989). Acts f  and g  are comonotonic if  there do not exist a , a  [0,1] such that 
f a )  > f(a) and g(a) < g(a). In words, the acts do not order states in contradictory manners.
A set of acts is comonotonic if  every pair of acts in the set is comonotonic. Obviously, every 
constant act is comonotonic with every other act.
Rank-dependent utility was introduced in Quiggin (1982), under the special assumption 
that w(1/2)=1/2. That assumption was subsequently criticized by economists. It was argued 
that "pessimism" would be the general phenomenon. Pessimism implies that a decision maker 
assigns relatively more importance in a decision to the relatively unfavorable outcomes of that 
decision. It can be modeled by convexity of the weighting function.2 Indeed, it is readily seen 
that convexity of the weighting function means that differences w(p+e)-w(p) are relatively 
smaller if  p  is smaller. Since our method of integration starts with the highest outcomes, this
means that the highest outcomes receive relatively smaller decision weights Kf =
i i1
w( %pj) -  w( ^ p ) .  Convexity of the weighting function cannot be satisfied under Quiggins as­
sumption that w(1/2)=1/2 , unless the trivial case of the identity-weighting function.
Psychological research has revealed, however, that pessimism and risk aversion are not 
universal phenomena. Rather, for small probability/large gain gambles, the majority of people 
tends to be risk seeking. This is exhibited for instance by the existence and popularity of gam­
bles. It can be explained under rank-dependent utility by an S-shaped weighting function, that 
is concave on an interval [0,p], and convex on an interval [p,1]. Such a function can very well 
agree with Quiggins (1982) assumption that w(1/2)=1/2 , although empirical research suggests 
that w(1/2) is somewhat smaller than 1/2 .
In the ensuing formal analysis we restrict attention to linear utility functions. It is well un­
derstood that this assumption is not empirically realistic; still it is a useful working hypothesis 
to most clearly bring to the fore the characteristics of the weighting function. This is similar to 
Yaaris (1987) approach, where also linearity of utility was imposed.
Wakker (1990a) characterized rank-dependent utility (for uncertainty) with linear utility 
functions and either convex or concave weighting functions. This has also been done by Yaari 
(1987) and Chateauneuf (1991). The result of Wakker (1990a) was different because it charac­
terized convexity/concavity directly in terms of a basic condition for rank-dependent utility: the 
comonotonicity condition. In view of the new insights in the empirically prevailing shape of the 
weighting functions, it seems warranted that the axiomatization of Wakker (1990a) be adapted 
to S-shaped weighting functions; that is the purpose of this section.
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The following definition is similar to the independence condition for decisions under risk 
that underlies the utility result of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). There is, however, 
one essential difference, and that is that in the condition below outcomes are mixed, and not 
probabilities. We shall nevertheless use the same terminology as for probability mixtures, 
because the conditions can be identified in a mathematical sense; compare Wakker (1990a, 
Appendix). Also the condition is given in a comonotonic version.
DEFINITION 1 We say that f  satisfies (mixture-)independence if, for all acts {f, g, h} and 0
< a  < 1,
f  f  g ^  a  f  + (1 -a )h f a  g  + ( 1-a )h . (1)
We say that f  satisfies comonotonic independence if  implication (1) is required only when 
{ f, g , h } are comonotonic.
Elucidation for comonotonic independence has been given in Section 4 in Wakker (1990a). It 
can be readily verified that mixture independence, in the presence of the usual assumptions, 
characterizes expected value maximization, thus uniquely determines the preference relation. 
For instance this can be derived from the theorem below.
A version of the following theorem for uncertainty was given in Wakker (1990a, Theorem
5 and Appendix). Wakker (1990c) showed how to derive the present risk result from it. For 
uncertainty, very similar results are given in Schmeidler (1989), Wakker (1990b, Theorems 6, 
11), and Chateauneuf (1991). For risk, similar results are provided in Yaari (1987), Weymark 
(1981, Theorem 3), Wakker (1987, Theorem 4.2), Chateauneuf (1990, 1991).
THEOREM 2 The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Rank-dependent utility holds, where the utility for money is linear.
(ii) The preference relation f  satisfies comonotonic independence.
Further, the weighting function in (i) is uniquely determined. ♦
It can readily be derived from Wakker (1990a, Corollary 8 and Lemma 10) that w in the above 
theorem is convex if and only if  comonotonic independence is strengthened to the following 
condition: pessimism-independence holds if implication (1) is required only when g,h  are 
comonotonic. Similarly, w  is concave if and only if the following condition holds: implication 
(1) is required only when f, h  are comonotonic (optimism-independence). Wakker (1990a) 
gave the results for uncertainty, but it is well known that the conditions obtained there are, for 
uncertainty, equivalent to convexity, or concavity respectively, of the weighting function w.
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Next we turn to the condition to characterize the S-shape for weighting functions. In this, 
P(M,p) is the subset of gambles that assign a probability of at least p  to the maximal outcome 
M, and P(0,1-p ) denotes the subset of P of those gambles that assign a probability of at least 
1 - p  to the zero outcome.
LEMMA 3 Suppose rank-dependent utility holds with linear utility. Then the weighting func­
tion is concave on [0,p] i f  and only i f  p  satisfies optimism-independence on the set P(0,1-p) , 
and it is convex on [p,1] ifa n d  only i f  p  satisfies pessimism-independence on the set P(M,p).
Proof. First consider the set P(0,1-p), and let (x1,p1,...,xn,pn) be an element thereof. It can be 
transformed into another gamble, as follows: First, the probability for the 0 outcome is de­
creased by 1-p; then, second, this probability 1- p  is distributed evenly over the remaining out­
comes (which may still include 0), in other words, all remaining probabilities are multiplied by 
1/p. Through this transformation, the preference relation and the rank-dependent representation 
can be transferred into a new preference relation and rank-dependent representation on the en­
tire ("isomorphic") set P. The property of optimism-independence is carried over by this trans­
formation; therefore, for the new rank-dependent representation, the weighting function w  is 
concave on [0,1] if  and only if optimism-independence is satisfied on P(0,1-p). Now w(q) = 
w  (q/p ) w(p) for all 0 < q < p, so concavity of w  on [0,p] holds if  and only if  optimism-in- 
dependence holds on P(0,1-p).
The result concerning the set P(M,p) can be derived similarly, now probability p  is propor­
tionally shifted from outcome M to  the other outcomes, and one proceeds as above. *
We are now ready to formulate the condition to characterize rank-dependent utility with linear 
utility and an S-shaped weighting function. We say that f  satisfies S-shape independence for 
probability p  if  implication is required whenever either {f, g, h} are comonotonic, or g, h  are 
comonotonic and f, g, h  assign probability p  or higher to the outcome M, or f, h  are comono­
tonic and f, g, h  assign probability 1- p  or higher to the outcome 0.
THEOREM 4 The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Rank-dependent utility holds, where the utility for money is linear, and w is concave 
on [0,p] and convex on [p, 1] .
(ii) The preference relation f  satisfies S-shape independence for probability p.
*
The weighting functions characterized above will be most regular and appealing if they are dif­
ferentiable at the point p .
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3. D iscu ss ion
The overweighting of small probabilities explains why people consider long shot gambles at­
tractive. But popular lotteries are also typically characterized by various smaller prizes. The 
model with linear utility, characterized above, does not explain why such lotteries are preferred 
to single prize lotteries. If, however, we incorporate utility effects and a reference point effect, 
the presence of smaller prizes can be explained. To explain the idea, we compare a single prize 
lottery (M, p; 0, 1-p) to a two prize lottery (M, q; m, r; 0 ,1 -q-r). The probability r  of win­
ning a small prize is assumed to be around 0.15 for a typical lottery. If we assume a weighting 
function similar to Figure 1, this implies that the probability of winning the smaller prize is also 
overweighted.3 Assume that both lotteries have the same expected value, so Mp equals Mq + 
mr. These lotteries can be expected to yield the same profit to the operator. According to the 
model with linear utility, the single prize lottery has a value of w(p)M  and the two prize lottery 
has value w(q)M  + [w(q+r)-w(q)]m. The single prize lottery has the higher value, which is 
derived from concavity of w  on the relevant interval.4
If we assume diminishing marginal utility for the outcomes of the lotteries, not yet 
characterized by the model (a characterization is provided Wakker and Tversky, 1993), the 
evaluation of the two lotteries becomes different. The two prize lottery becomes better, relative 
to the single prize lottery, because the smaller prize of the two prize lottery has a relatively 
higher utility than the top prize of the single prize lottery. Without specific assumptions about 
the weighting and utility function, however, no definite predictions can be made.
A second phenomenon not yet incorporated in the present model is loss aversion. Subjects 
tend to attach much more value to an amount of money that may be lost than to the same 
amount that may be gained. This results in a distinctive effect on the evaluation of both lotter­
ies, to the favor of the two prize lottery. When participating in the single prize lottery, people 
are almost certain to lose their ticket fee. The two prize lottery, however, produces a reasonable 
chance to avoid a loss (while retaining the long shot effect). Because losses loom larger than 
gains, it is expected that people will prefer the reasonable chance to break even at least, to an 
almost certain loss. This we call the break even effect.
The break even effect is enhanced by the underweighting of moderate to large prob­
abilities. This was pointed out by Quiggin (1991), and can be illustrated by treating the zero 
outcomes in the two exemplary lotteries as the outcomes denoting the loss of the ticket fee. The 
chance of losing the ticket fee in the two prize lottery is now 1-(q+r) . This probability is 
underweighted if the chance to win a prize is overweighted, as is hypothesized (see Figure 1). 
For the one prize lottery the probability of losing is also underweighted by the same argument, 
but it will not result in a significant effect: the probability of losing still does not deviate much 
from unity. So probability distortion, modeled with an S-shaped weighting function, acts like a 
two-edged sword enhancing the popularity of a two prized, long shot lottery: on the one hand, 
the chance on winning the top prize or a smaller prize is overweighted, on the other hand the 
chance of losing the ticket fee is underweighted.
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So far we have been arguing that a probability-distortion effect can explain why certain 
kinds of gambles are more popular than others, thus accommodating observed gambling behav­
ior. But gambling behavior is complex, so it is to be expected that other psychological factors 
are relevant for explaining why people find lotteries attractive, even if these are actuarially far 
from fair. The already mentioned element of joy and excitement of gambling constitutes an im­
portant explanatory factor. We think that phenomena explaining the preference reversal effect 
also play a role in explaining the popularity of gambles, and turn now to a discussion of these.
The preference reversal effect, discovered by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), has been 
well established. Subjects are presented with a bet providing a high chance of getting a small 
amount of money (the P-bet) and a bet giving a small probability for a large amount of money 
(the $-bet), mostly with a slightly higher expected value. When asked to choose between those 
two bets most people opt for the P-bet, but when they are asked to state their minimal selling 
prizes, they state a higher amount for the $-bet. Moreover, Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) 
found that when subjects were asked to rank the two bets by the attractiveness of the bets, the 
P-bet was chosen far more often. But in terms of the minimum selling prize, the $-bet is quite 
often ranked higher.
Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) show that the preference reversal phenomenon 
cannot be explained plausibly by violations of independence or reduction of compound 
lotteries. People rather violate procedure invariance: various seemingly equivalent elicitation- 
procedures for ranking gambles lead to different rank-orderings. One of the effects leading to 
violations of procedure invariance is scale-compatibility (Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988). If 
people are asked to rank gambles according to their minimal selling prices, people will pay 
more attention to the value of the outcomes. This way to elicit preferences makes the $-bet more 
attractive. If people are asked to make a choice, they make a more integrated evaluation, 
comparing the trade-off in probability and pay-off. This procedure thus leads to more attention 
for the probability distribution, enhancing the attractiveness of the P-bet.
People presumably do not order lotteries by a mechanism of pricing. For example, there 
does not exist a bargaining mechanism for lottery tickets. The decision to buy a lottery ticket is 
a choice, where participation is preferred over abstaining. But typical lotteries exclusively direct 
attention to the outcomes: probabilities are never made explicitly available to the buyers. This 
prevents the buyer from making the integrated evaluation as done in the choice problems in 
preference reversal experiments. Instead, the buyer is led to evaluate the lottery on the only 
scale available, which causes her to overvalue the lottery. Research on the preference reversal 
effect shows that if  people primarily pay attention to the money scale, they are prone to an 
overpricing of the $-bet: Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman (1990) found that 83.9% of the 
subjects showing preference reversals overpriced the $-bet.
We conclude that recent developments in decision theory improve our understanding of 
the buying of lotteries.
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N otes
1 It should be noted that Friedman and Savage interchange the terms convex and concave compared to current 
terminology.
2 Here we emphasize that our way of integration is dual to the one most common in decisions under risk for 
rank-dependent utility; convexity of our weighting function is equivalent to concavity of the weighting function 
in the more common approach. We chose our way of integration because it is more common in decisions under 
uncertainty, and has been used in cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
3 Formally, the smaller prize will be overweighted if w(q+r)- w(q)>r.
4 This can be shown as follows. We can rewrite the two prize lottery as (M,bp; aM,(p-bp)/a; 0, 1-bp-(p-bp)/a), 
0<a,b<1, thus satisfying equality of expected value. The rank-dependent value of the two prize lottery now 
becomes: w(bp)M+ aM[M.(p-bp)/a+bp)w(bp)]. This can be rewritten as M{(1 a)w(bp) + a w([(1 b)/a]p+bp)} 
which by concavity of w is smaller (or equal) than Mw([1a]bp + (1b)p + abp) = Mw(p) which is the rank- 
dependent value of the single prize lottery.
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Abstract
This chapter discusses differences between prospect theory and cumulative prospect theory. It 
shows that cumulative prospect theory is not merely a formal correction of some theoretical 
problems in prospect theory, but it also gives different predictions. Some experiments by Lola 
Lopes are re-analyzed, and are demonstrated to favor cumulative prospect theory over prospect 
theory. It turns out that the mathematical form of cumulative prospect theory is well suited for 
modeling the psychological phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity.
Key words: Prospecttheory, Diminishing sensitivity, Rank-dependence, Decisionweights, 
Risk aversion
Fennema, Hein & Peter P. Wakker. (1996). "Original and Cumulative Prospect Theory: A 
Discussion of Empirical Differences," Journal o f Behavioral Decision Making 10, 53-64.
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Prospect Theory (PT) has been one of the most important theories of decision making under 
risk in the past decade, and has been applied in a wide variety of contexts. By including distor­
tions of probabilities, diminishing sensitivity, and the status quo as a reference point, PT can 
explain the major deviations from expected utility such as the Allais paradox, the certainty ef­
fect, and framing effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). However, there are some theoretical 
problems in PT. The main problem is that the functional form of PT violates stochastic domi­
nance, i.e. if  a first prospect yields higher outcomes than a second then the first prospect 
should necessarily be preferred (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 283-4).
The theoretical problems have recently been solved in a new version of PT, called 
cumulative prospect theory (CPT), that was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992); in 
particular, CPT satisfies stochastic dominance. Similar forms were introduced by Starmer and 
Sugden (1989a) and Luce and Fishburn (1991). Cumulative prospect theory adopts the rank- 
dependent method for transforming probabilities that was introduced by Quiggin (1982); see 
also Lopes (1984), Luce (1988), and Allais (1988). For a survey of non-expected utility, see 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1988) and Camerer (1992).
This chapter describes the PT and CPT theories and discusses differences. In particular, 
we find that CPT does not only avoid some theoretical problems, but also gives different 
empirical predictions that, for the experiments considered in this chapter, are better than the 
original PT. The key feature of CPT is that it permits a satisfactory modeling of diminishing 
sensitivity, not only with respect to outcomes, but also with respect to changes in probabilities. 
A major motivation for this chapter has been to demonstrate the central role of diminishing 
sensitivity in human decision making.
The next section describes the theories; empirical predictions are derived subsequently. 
The presentation requires some mathematical derivations. We hope, however, that these help to 
clarify the features and the meaning of the new CPT theory. We also hope that this chapter can 
be an aid for making the mathematics of CPT accessible. Because of the empirical importance 
of CPT, and because its mathematics is not elementary, such an aid is warranted.
1. The theories
This section describes the PT and CPT theories. By (x1,p1;...;xn,pn) we denote the prospect 
that yields $xj with probability pj , j= 1 -n . Throughout, for convenience of the exposition, we 
arrange the prospect so that x 1 < ... < xn. In PT and CPT, risk attitudes depend both on the 
attitude towards outcomes (through a value function) and on the attitude towards probabilities 
(through a weighting function). A risk attitude then becomes a combination of both the attitude 
towards probability and the attitude towards outcomes.
We first describe PT. In PT an editing phase is defined in which prospects are organized 
and reformulated. In the notation of prospects, this implies that same outcomes are to be "col-
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lapsed." For instance, (y,.3; y,.2; z,.5) must be rewritten as (y,.5; z,.5). Hence xi < ••• < xn 
is assumed in the discussion of PT. Let us emphasize that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) only 
formulated their theory for prospects with at most two nonzero outcomes. We presently extend 
it in a straightforward manner to prospects with more outcomes, as it was suggested by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 288) and has been used frequently by other authors. We 
only give the PT value for prospects (x i,p i;..;x n,pn) with both positive outcomes (gains) and 
negative outcomes (losses). Then the PT value is
n(p)v(xi) + .. + n(pn)v(xn). ( 1)
Here v is the value function for outcomes, describing the subject's valuation of money. As 
usual, we set v(0) = 0 throughout the chapter. The probability weighting function n describes 
the subject's attitude towards probabilities. PT adopts a different formula for evaluating 
prospects with only gains or only losses. As such prospects are not considered in this chapter, 
the formula is not given; for a discussion, see Miyamoto (1987). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) propose a value function with a reflection point at the status quo outcome, located at 
zero (see Figure 1). They find that v is S-shaped, reflecting the principle of "diminishing 
sensitivity" for the evaluation of outcomes. For example, the subject discriminates less between 
80 and 100 than between 0 and 20, both when these numbers concern gains and when they 
concern losses. Note that for losses the value function in Figure 1 contradicts the common 
economic assumption of diminishing marginal utility, according to which a dollar is always 
appreciated less as a person becomes more wealthy. It is also found that v is steeper for losses 
than for gains ("loss aversion"); e.g., a loss of $80 is felt more than a gain of $80.
Probability p
Figure 1. The value function assumed by PT and CPT Figure 2. A typical weighting function for PT.
Kahneman and Tversky find that preferences of subjects can best be modeled by a weight­
ing function that enhances small probabilities and reduces higher probabilities. Hence the
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weighting function is relatively sensitive to changes in probability near the end points 0 and 1, 
but is relatively insensitive to changes in probability in the middle region. At the end points the 
weighting function is not well behaved. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) give a hypothetical 
weighting function, conforming with their data (see Figure 2). The function is curved upwards 
where it is well-behaved, and this has been the usual assumption in the literature (Camerer, 
1989; Starmer, 1992; Lopes, 1993).
If the probability weighting function for gains were linear (not curved), then the risk 
attitude for gains would be entirely determined by the value function and it is well-known that 
the shape in Figure 1 then would imply risk aversion. If the value function were linear for 
gains, then the risk attitude for gains would be entirely determined by the probability weighting 
function for gains and it is well-known that the shape in Figure 3 implies risk seeking in small- 
probability prospects and risk aversion in large-probability prospects. In general, the two 
functions jointly determine the risk attitude.
CPT uses a value function v with the same characteristics as in PT. The determination of 
decision weights deviates from PT, however. The idea of CPT, elaborated below, is to apply 
Quiggin's (1982) "rank-dependent functional" separately to gains and losses, and then take the 
sum of the two resulting evaluations. A weighting function w+ is defined for the probabilities 
associated with gains, and a separate weighting function w-  is defined for probabilities associ­
ated with losses. This allows for different attitudes towards probability for gains than for 
losses. CPT permits that outcomes are not distinct in the notation (x1,p 1; . . ;x n,pn) for 
prospects. Suppose for simplicity that x 1 < .. < xk < 0 < xk+1 < ... < xn. Then the CPT value 
of the prospect (x1,p1;..;xn,pn) is given by the following formula:
k n
% t-v (x i)  + +v(xi), (2)
i=1 i=k+1
where the decision weights (i.e., the numbers n- , rc+j) are defined by: 
n -  = w- (pi), n -  = w- (p1+...+pi) -  w - (p1+ ...+pi-1), 2 < i < k, 
n+ = w +(pn), n+ = w +(pi+...+pn)-  w+(pi+1+...+pn), k+1 < i < n - 1.
The novelty of this formula as compared to PT is the more subtle way of transforming proba­
bilities. It is instructive to first consider the CPT formula (2) for the special case where w(p) = p 
for all p, i.e. probabilities are not transformed. Then the decision weights ni are all equal to pi, 
so that the traditional expected utility formula results. This reasoning shows that CPT is indeed 
a generalization of expected utility.
To explain the above formula, let us first repeat that in PT probabilities for the receipt of 
separate outcomes were transformed, i.e. each probability pi for receiving the separate outcome 
xi was transformed into the decision weight n(pi). In the above formula, "cumulative proba­
bilities" are transformed for gains, and "decumulative probabilities" for losses. We first con­
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sider the case of gains. A cumulative probability describes the probability for receiving an out­
come or anything better than that outcome. For instance, P i+ .+ pn is the cumulative probability 
of receiving outcome xi or anything better. Decision weights for gains are obtained as differ­
ences between transformed values of cumulative probabilities. Similarly, for losses decision 
weights are obtained as differences between transformed values of consecutive decumulative 
probabilities, i.e. probabilities describing the receipt of an outcome or anything worse than that 
outcome.
Probability p 
Figure 3. A typical CPT weighting function.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find that for the majority of subjects the weighting 
function is as depicted in Figure 3. This weighting function exhibits "diminishing sensitivity" 
with respect to probability changes, i.e., the function is relatively sensitive to changes in 
probability near the end points 0 and 1 but is relatively insensitive to changes in probability in 
the middle region. The weighting function in Figure 3 is the estimate w+ for gains; the loss 
weighting function w-  has, on average, a similar shape, but it seems to be somewhat higher 
and less curved.
The problem of the calculation of decision weights in PT, with regard to the 
generalization to many (different) outcome prospects, can be illustrated by the following 
example. Suppose we have a prospect with many different outcomes as follows: (-10, .05; 0, 
.05; 10, .05; 20, .05 ; 30, .05;...; 180, .05). If n (.05) is larger than .05 (as is commonly 
found) then each outcome is overweighted, and for the common value functions the prospect 
will be valued higher than its expected value $85 for sure. It is very implausible that people will 
prefer the prospect to its expected value for sure. This anomaly is a consequence of the 
overweighting of all outcomes, a phenomenon that also underlies the violations of stochastic 
dominance.
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The new way of transforming probabilities circumvents the above problem. Only the ex­
treme outcomes are overweighted. For example, the $180 outcome receives decision weight 
w+(0.05), and the -  $10 outcome receives decision weight w- (0.05); as Figure 3 shows, these 
outcomes are overweighted. The middle outcomes receive small decision weights, for example, 
the $100 outcome receives a decision weight of w+(.45) -  w+(.40). Here Figure 3 shows that 
this outcome is underweighted according to CPT. This agrees with a principle of diminishing 
sensitivity with respect to the impact of outcomes. Intuitively it seems clear that people will be 
most sensitive to extreme outcomes, and less to intermediate outcomes. The experiments below 
show that this intuition is correct and also that this can be modeled by CPT and not by (the 
straightforward generalization of) PT. Arguments for the plausibility of the cumulative form 
have been given by Wakker (1989). For further elucidations and worked-out numerical exam­
ples, see Weber (1994).
The next section describes some empirical differences between PT and CPT. This demon­
strates that CPT is not merely a formal correction of some theoretical problems in PT, but that it 
also gives different predictions. We show that two experiments, conducted by Lopes (1993) to 
test PT, are especially suited for discriminating between PT and CPT. The first experiment tests 
the shape of the weighting function. The S-shaped weighting function of CPT explains the data 
better than the weighting function that is commonly assumed for PT (see Figure 2). The first 
experiment does not reject the general formula of PT, i.e. PT with the S-shaped weighting 
function of CPT explains the data as well as CPT does. A test of the general formula of PT 
against that of CPT is provided by the second experiment. PT's transformation of separate 
probabilities is rejected to the favor of CPT's transformation of cumulative probabilities. Let us 
repeat that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) only formulated their form for prospects with at 
most two nonzero outcomes. The experiments below extend the form to four and six nonzero 
outcomes.
2. Experiment 1
In the first experiment two prospects are considered, the Bimodal prospect and the Peaked 
prospect (Figure 4). The outcome of each prospect is decided by randomly drawing one ticket 
from twenty numbered tickets. For example, the Peaked prospect yields -$200 if ticket 1 or 2 
is drawn, ..., $200 if ticket 19 or 20 is drawn. Thus,
(-200,.10; -100,.20; 0,.40; 100,.20; 200,.10) 
describes the Peaked prospect. The subjects were undergraduate students, 56 in the original 
experiment by Lopes and 49 in a replication performed by us. They were asked to state in 
which of the two prospects a change of one ticket from a -$200 outcome to a $200 outcome 
gives the best improvement. Note that these questions elicit strength of preference judgments, 
and do not refer to direct choices or preferences.
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Following Lopes' analysis, we assume that the elicited strengths of preferences are repre­
sented by differences in PT or CPT values. The change in PT value for the Bimodal prospect is
-$200 1 1 1 1 -$200
-$100 1 1 1 -$100
BIMODAL: $0 1 PEAKED: $0 I I
$100 1 1 1 $100
$200 1 1 1 1 $200
Figure 4. Bars indicate lottery tickets, numbered from the upper left to the lower right.
obtained by substituting the PT formula (1) and subtracting. The probability of the $200 out­
come increases from 0.25 to 0.30 and therefore its decision weight increases by n(.30) -  
n(.25). Similarly the decision weight of the -$200 outcome decreases by n(.25) -  n(.20). For 
all other outcomes the probabilities and decision weights remain unaffected. For the Bimodal 
prospect, the PT change resulting from the outcome change is therefore
(n(.30) -  n(.25))v($200) -  (n(.25) -  n(.20))v(-$200). (3)
For the Peaked prospect, the change is
(n(.15) -  n(.10))v($200) -  (n(.10) -  n(.05))v(-$200). (4)
PT makes no clear prediction here. If the weighting function is linear in the region [.05,.30] for 
most subjects, then the two changes give approximately the same improvement for most sub­
jects, and approximately half of the subjects can be expected to prefer the Peaked-change. 
Assume, as in Figure 2, that the weighting function is actually curved upwards in the region 
[.05, .30]. Then
(i) n(.30) -  n(.25) > n(.15) -  n(.10) so that the first term in (3) is larger than the first term
in (4);
(ii) n(.25) -  n(.20) > n(.10) -n(.05) so that less (a more negative number) is subtracted in
(3) than in (4).
Both (i) and (ii) make (3) larger than (4). Therefore, PT predicts that a majority of subjects will 
prefer the Bimodal-change. Experimentally, however, a clear majority (84% of the subjects in 
Lopes' experiment, and 63% in our replication), preferred the Peaked-change. PT can accom­
modate these findings if the weighting function is curved downwards in the region [.05, .30], 
as in Figure 3.1 Then the above inequalities are reversed, leading to a preference for the Peaked 
prospect.
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The experimental finding can also be explained by CPT, as is demonstrated next. The 
demonstration is based on the observation that the changes of outcomes for the Peaked prospect 
are located at more extreme tickets than for the Bimodal prospect. CPT predicts that more deci­
sion weight is assigned to extreme outcomes, reflecting diminishing sensitivity, therefore CPT 
predicts that the changes for the Peaked prospect induce greater changes in evaluation. Next we 
show this mathematically. It is convenient for the subsequent analysis to denote the outcomes 
for each ticket separately (which is permitted in the CPT notations). Thus, we denote the 
Peaked prospect here by
(-200,.05; -200,.05; -100 ,.05 ;..; 100,.05; 200,.05; 200,.05), 
and the Bimodal prospect similarly.
Table 1.___________________________________________________________________________
PEAKED PROSPECT BIMODAL PROSPECT
Ticket step 1 step 2 step 3 step 4 step 1 step 2 step 3 step 4
20 $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o
19 $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o
18 $100 $100 $100 $100 $200 $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o
17 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o
16 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $200o $200o $200o $200o $200o
15 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $200
14 $0o $0o $0o $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100
13 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $100 $100 $100 $100 $100
12 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $100 $100 $100 $100 $100
11 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $100 $100
10 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o
9 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o -$100 -$100 $0 $0o $0o
8 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100
7 $0o $0o $0o $0o $0o -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100
6 -$100 -$100 $0 $0o $0o -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100
5 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 - $ 200o-$100 -$100 -$100 -$100
4 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 - $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o-$ 200o
3 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 - $ 200o-$ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o-$ 200o
2 - $ 200o-$100 -$100 -$100 -$100 - $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o-$ 200o
1 - $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o - $ 200o-$ 200o- $ 200o- $ 200o-$ 200o
In cumulative formulas, it is useful to preserve the rank-ordering of outcomes in the 
subsequent analysis because then all prospects have the same decision weights.2 This can be 
ensured in the following manner, illustrated in Table 1. First, the change of outcome of -$200 
to $200 is performed in four steps (with changes underlined in the exhibit): from -$200 to
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-$100, from -$100 to $0, from $0 to $100, and from $100 to $200. Second, we locate the 
first change in the Peaked prospect at ticket number 2, the second at ticket number 6, the third 
at ticket number 14, and the fourth at ticket number 18. Then always ticket 1 generates the 
lowest outcome, .., and ticket 20 the highest so that the rank-ordering of outcomes is indeed 
preserved. The change in CPT value generated by the first outcome change in step 1 (changing 
-200 into -100 for the second ticket) is calculated by substituting the CPT formula (2) (with k 
= 10) and subtracting. Because the outcomes for the tickets, other than the second, are not 
changed and neither are their decision weights, their contributions to the CPT formula cancel, 
and the only difference in the CPT formula is due to the second ticket. Before the outcome 
change, the second ticket contributed n^v(-200) to the CPT value, after the outcome change it 
contributes rc- v(-100). Hence the outcome change generates a CPT increase of n- (v(-100) -  
v(-200)). Similarly, the CPT increases due to the second, third, and fourth outcome changes 
are n- (v(0) -  v(-100)), rc+j(v(100) -  v(0)), and n+8(v(200) -  v(100)), respectively. The sum 
of these four CPT changes is the increase in CPT value generated by changing one -$200 ticket 
into a $200 ticket for the Peaked prospect.
For the Bimodal prospect, the four changes from -$200 to -$100, from -$100 to $0,
from $0 to $100, and from $100 to $200, are located at tickets 5, 9, 11, and 15, and generate 
increases in CPT values of n- (v(-100) -  v(-200)), n- (v(0) -  v(-100)), n 1+1(v(100) -  v(0)), 
and rc+5(v(200) -  v(100)). The sum of these four increases is the increase of CPT value gen­
erated by changing one -$200 ticket into a $200 ticket for the Bimodal prospect.
The first, second, and fourth increases are clearly greater for the Peaked prospect, because 
n -  > n - , n-  > n - , and n +8 > n +5 assuming the weighting function w+ of Figure 3. For exam­
ple, n +8 > n +5 can be rewritten as w+(.15) -  w+(.10) > w+(.30) -  w+(.25), which inequality 
can be inferred from Figure 3. The other inequalities can be derived similarly. The third in­
crease is approximately the same for both prospects. In sum, the overall increase for the Peaked 
prospect is larger than for the Bimodal prospect. This prediction of CPT is in agreement with 
the empirical finding.
The above derivation shows that the CPT functional reflects diminishing sensitivity with 
respect to probability transformations. For the change that is offered in the Peaked Prospect, 
the probability of the most serious loss is reduced from 0.10 to 0.05, whereas in the Bimodal 
Prospect this probability is reduced from 0.25 to 0.20. Psychologically, the latter change has 
less impact. At the gain side, the change offered also favors the Peaked prospect, for people are 
more sensitive to a change in probability from 0.10 to 0.15 than to a change of 0.25 to 0.30.
3. Experiment 2
In the second experiment, the different predictions of CPT are a result of the cumulative method 
of valuation, and the general formula of PT is falsified irrespective of what weighting function 
is used in PT. We consider the prospect, illustrated in Figure 5, that yields -$300 if ticket 1, 2,
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or 3 is drawn, ..., and $300 if ticket 19, 20, or 21 is drawn. The experiment concerns changes 
of this prospect obtained by moving one ticket a category upwards. For example, one ticket that 
yields $0 can be changed into a ticket yielding $100. Changing a $300 outcome is not included, 
so six changes are possible. Subjects (n = 42, undergraduate students) had to choose between 
two prospects that both resulted from the original prospect by a (different) change of a ticket. 
For all 15 possible pairs of such altered prospects, subjects had to make a choice. The classical 
expected utility model with risk aversion (i.e., diminishing marginal utility) predicts that sub­
jects prefer to move tickets associated with lower outcomes. Next we analyze the predictions of 
PT and CPT. We shall find the strongest divergence for the preference between changing a 
-$300 outcome and changing a -$200 outcome, and for the preference between changing a 
$100 outcome and changing a $200 outcome.
-$300 I I I 
-$200 I I I 
-$100 I I I 
$ 0 1 1 1  
$100 I I I 
$200 
$300
Figure 5. Bars indicate lottery tickets, numbered from the upper left to the lower right.
Consider changing x into x+100 for one ticket. Such a change is called an "x move" hence­
forth. We calculate the resulting PT change. The probability of the outcome x decreases from 
3/21 to 2/21, hence its contribution to the PT value decreases by (n(3/21) -  n(2/21))v(x). The 
probability of the outcome x+100 increases from 3/21 to 4/21, hence its contribution to the PT 
value increases by (n(4/21) -  n(3/21))v(x+100). In total, the PT change is
(n(4/21) -  n(3/21))v(x+100) -  (n(3/21) -  n(2/21))v(x).
Subtracting (n(4/21) - n(3/21))v(x) from the first term, and adding it to the second, gives
(n(4/21) -  n(3/21))(v(x+100) -  v(x)) + (n(4/21) -  2n(3/21) + n(2/21))v(x). (5)
Let us consider the first term in Formula 5; this captures the effect of curvature of the value 
function. For losses, diminishing sensitivity implies that the value difference v(x+100) -  v(x) 
will be largest for x = -100, smaller for x = -200, and smallest for x = -300. For gains, dimin­
ishing sensitivity implies that the value difference will be largest for x = 0, smaller for x = 100, 
and smallest for x = 200. Comparisons between gains and losses cannot be predicted with cer­
tainty but, because "losses loom larger than gains,"3 the changes for losses will be larger than
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the changes for the corresponding gains. At any rate, both for gains and for losses, the first 
term in (5) is larger for middle values of x than for extreme values.
Next we consider the second term in Formula 5; this captures the effect of curvature of the 
weighting function. For a subject for whom
n(4/21) -  2n(3/21) + n(2/21) 0 (6)
(this holds under "convexity," such as in Figure 2), the second term is increasing in x, thus is 
largest for x = 200, and smallest for x = -300. Combining this with the behavior of the first 
term, we conclude that the change at x = -200 then is larger than the change at x = -300. A 
comparison between the changes at x = 100 and x = 200 cannot be made directly, because the 
first and second term produce opposite effects.
For a subject for whom
n(4/21) -  2n(3/21) + n(2/21) < 0 (7)
(this holds under "concavity," such as in Figure 3), the second term is decreasing in x, thus is 
largest for x = -300, and smallest for x = 200. Combining this with the behavior of the first 
term, we conclude that the change at x = 100 then is larger than the change at x = 200. Now a 
comparison between the changes at x = -200 and x = -300 cannot be made directly, because the 
first and second term produce opposite effects.
Let us summarize the predictions of PT concerning two preferences, the preference 
between the -200 move and -300 move, and the preference between the 100 move and the 200 
move.
(i) If (6) holds for the majority of subjects
then -200 move strictly preferred over -300 move 
and 100 move ? 200 move
(ii) If (7) holds for the majority of subjects
then 100 move strictly preferred over 200 move
and -200 move -300 move
for the majority;
(no clear prediction).
for the majority;
(no clear prediction).
If there is no pronounced majority of subjects for whom inequalities (6) or (7) hold, then there 
will be majority preferences both for the -200  move over the -300  move, and for the 100 
move over the 200 move.
Overall, PT predicts that more subjects will prefer moving middle outcomes than moving 
extreme outcomes. Lopes' experiment gave opposite results: a clear majority (90%) preferred 
the -300 move over the -200 move, and similarly the majority (86%) preferred the 200 move 
over the 100 move.
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We now turn to an analysis of the above example through CPT, where diminishing sensi­
tivity and thus the weighting function of Figure 3 are assumed. We locate the moves at tickets
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18, respectively, to preserve the rank-ordering where always ticket 1 
yields the lowest outcome, .., and ticket 21 the highest. First we concentrate on the role of the 
value function and disregard the effect of the weighting function (i.e., assume it's linear). 
Then, for losses, diminishing sensitivity of the value function implies that the -100 move is 
most preferred, the -200 move is less preferred, and the -300 move is the least preferred. For 
gains, diminishing sensitivity implies that the 0 move is most preferred, the 100 move is less 
preferred, and the 200 move is the least preferred.
Next we concentrate on the role of the weighting function, and disregard the effect of the 
value function. By diminishing sensitivity of the weighting function w-  for losses, the tickets 
associated with more extreme outcomes get higher decision weights and the -300 move (ticket 
3) is preferred to the -200 move (ticket 6), which in turn is preferred to the -100 move (ticket 
9). Similarly, diminishing sensitivity of the weighting function w+ implies that the 200 move is 
preferred to the 100 move, which is preferred to the 0 move.
Summarizing, both for gains and for losses, curvature of the value function favors 
middle-outcome moves and curvature of the weighting function favors extreme-outcome 
moves. These effects being opposite, at this stage no definite predictions can be made. To 
decide on the prediction of CPT, we must decide which effect can be expected to be stronger. 
The outcomes are not very extreme and span only a small part of the total assets of the subjects 
(from -$300 until -$100 and from $0 until $200, respectively). Hence the effects of curvature 
of value are small, and the effects of probability weighting will be stronger. Therefore, a 
majority preference for the -300 move can be expected over the -200 move, in agreement with 
the above findings of Lopes' experiment (86%).4 Similarly, a majority preference for the 200 
move over the 100 move is predicted, again in agreement with the experiment (90%).5
In summary, in the second experiment CPT predicts a majority preference for extreme- 
outcome moves, both for gains and for losses, whereas PT predicts that at least in one case 
there should be a preference for middle-outcome moves. The great majority of subjects 
followed the CPT prediction. This result holds independently of the weighting function that one 
adopts in PT, and therefore this experiment provides empirical evidence against the general 
form of PT.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed differences between the original prospect theory and the new 
"cumulative" prospect theory. The latter has many advantages. Not only does it satisfy 
stochastic dominance, but we also find that it gives a better account for a number of empirical 
findings. Lopes' first experiment provides evidence for an S-shaped weighting function as in 
cumulative prospect theory, and her second experiment provides evidence against the general 
formula of prospect theory, independently of the adopted weighting function.
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We hope that this chapter has shown that the mathematical forms proposed by cumulative 
prospect theory agree well with the psychological principle of diminishing sensitivity.
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N otes
1 It may be useful here to emphasize that the PT weighting function applies to different probabilities than the 
one of CPT, i.e. to fixed-outcome probabilities and not to cumulative probabilities.
2 In general, a prospect (yi,pi;...;yn,pn) with y1 < ... < yk < 0< yk+1 < ... < yn has the same decision 
weights n- ,...,n- , nk+-1,...,n + as a prospect (x1,p1;...;xn,pn) with x1 < ... < xk < 0 <xk+1 < ... < xn. 
This can be inferred from Formula (2) and the subsequent text.
3 This phenomenon is confirmed by the experiment, for 69% of the subjects preferred the -300 move over the 
200 move, 67%preferred the -200 move over the 100 move, and 79% preferred the -100 move over the 0 
move.
4 The -300 move was preferred over the -100 move by 60% of the subjects (considerably less than 90%). This 
weaker preference can be explained because the decision weight of the ticket for the -100 move is not much 
smaller than of the ticket for the -200 move (w-  being approximately linear in the interior domain), but the 
value difference for the -100 move is considerably larger than for the -200 move, v being steepest near 0. 
Therefore the value function effect becomes relevant for the -100 move, and the move is less clearly dispreferred 
to the -300 move. This explains why we considered, for losses, the preference between the -300 and -200 
moves in the main text: here the CPT prediction differs most strongly from the PT prediction.
5 The 200 move was preferred over the 0 move by 69% of the subjects. The discussion is similar to the previ­
ous footnote.
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Abstract
Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily concentrated on decision 
under risk ("probability triangles"). The literature suggests, however, that ambiguity is one of 
the main causes for deviations from expected utility (EU). This chapter investigates the descrip­
tive performance of rank-dependent utility (RDU) in the context of choice under ambiguity. We 
use the axiomatic difference between RDU and EU to critically test RDU against EU. 
Surprisingly, the RDU model does not provide any descriptive improvement over EU. Our data 
suggest other, "framing," factors that do provide descriptive improvements over EU.
Key words: ambiguity, rank-dependence, non-expected utility, comonotonicity, presentation 
effects
Fennema, Hein & Peter P. Wakker (1996). "A Test of Rank-Dependent Utility in the Context of 
Ambiguity," Journal o f Risk and Uncertainty 13, 19-35.
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In the past decades, students of individual choice have demonstrated that preference behavior 
deviates from Expected Utility theory (EU). In response, various generalizations and alterna­
tives to EU have been put forward. Axioms that are thought to be descriptively invalid have 
been weakened to accommodate the observed violations. For most theorists the independence 
axiom is the major culprit, exemplified by the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes. In the early 
eighties, several new models have been proposed that weaken the independence axiom, thus 
generalizing EU. Two major kinds of transitive generalizations have emerged: betweenness 
models and rank-dependent models.
Recently, empirical research is cumulating that tests whether the new proposals are able to 
explain the experimental facts found so far (Camerer & Ho, 1994). Most of this research can be 
summarized using so called probability triangles. These triangles employ three outcomes that 
are kept constant. Gambles are constructed by varying the probabilities assigned to these 
outcomes. Most of the theories considered can be tested by observing preference behavior on 
selected pairs of gambles from these triangles. The overall picture emerging from this research 
is that none of the generalized expected utility theories can explain all the systematic violations 
that have been discovered. The betweenness condition, for example, is found to be 
systematically violated (Camerer & Ho, 1994). The rank-dependent models (RDU), especially 
the new version of prospect theory, Cumulative Prospect theory, are at the moment probably 
the leading contender for best descriptive theory. However, some remarks must be made.
First, several phenomena cannot be explained by the rank-dependent models. For 
instance, it turns out that the shapes of indifference curves in probability triangles are not 
independent of the amounts of money that are used, whereas they should be according to RDU. 
Second, to reach conclusions, most experiments done so far assume other axioms, such as 
transitivity and reduction, axioms that are also necessary for RDU. It is not always evident that 
the reported violations of EU are due to violations of the independence axiom rather than 
violations of the assumed axioms. (An exception is Camerer and Ho (1994), who did verify 
that their observed violations of betweenness were not due to violations of transitivity.)
Third, and perhaps most important, most of the research conducted so far is not very well 
suited for testing rank-dependent models. In probability triangles, outcomes are kept constant 
and probabilities are varied. Because RDU theories introduce the weighting of probabilities, 
they are especially well suited for handling variations in probability, and therefore impose few 
testable predictions on the probability triangle. Theories that do not assume a probability 
weighting function are tested more strictly in the triangle. It can be shown (Wakker, Erev & 
Weber, 1994, Observation 3) that it is not possible to test RDU conclusively with stimuli that 
employ only three outcomes, as is done in probability triangles. Another problem for proba­
bility triangles is that they can only be used to test theories for decision under risk, not for de­
cision under ambiguity. It is not a priori true that results concerning EU generalizations in the 
risky case can be extrapolated to the ambiguous case.
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Wakker (1996) outlines a test that provides a precise empirical demarcation between RDU 
and EU. This test avoids the complications described above and will be discussed in detail 
shortly. Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) employed the test in a risky setting and found a 
negative result. That is, there was no evidence that people were sensitive to rank-dependence in 
the context of risk. Thus, it appears that RDU also faces some serious descriptive shortcomings 
in the risky case.
This chapter studies the descriptive performance of RDU for decision under ambiguity. 
Outcomes are not generated with given probabilities, but depend on events with unknown 
probabilities generated by irregular dice. Although people rarely encounter decision situations 
where probabilities are known, nearly all experimental studies of decision making have con­
centrated on risk. (For a review of exceptions, see Camerer and Weber, 1992.) Therefore, little 
is known about the descriptive success of generalized EU and RDU under ambiguity. There 
are, however, several reasons why RDU can be expected to be more useful for ambiguity than 
for risk. This is explained next.
RDU generalizes EU by permitting decision weights to depend not only on events but also 
on outcomes. More precisely, the decision weights are affected by the rank-ordering of the 
outcomes. This outcome-dependence of decision weights can have more effect under ambiguity 
than under risk, because, under ambiguity, it will not only affect the weight of given 
probabilities in decisions but also the preceding assessment of such probabilities or likeli­
hoods.1 Hence weighting functions can be expected to exhibit more nonadditivity in ambiguity. 
Weber (1994) describes uncertainty concerning probability as the primary source for outcome 
dependence. In the normative model of Schmeidler (1989) that initiated the rank-dependent 
model for ambiguity, it was explicitly assumed that nonadditivity was only due to ambiguity 
and not to risk. Further, Tversky and Fox (1995) found more pronounced nonadditivity for 
ambiguity than for risk in an empirical study. These observations suggest that RDU can be a 
powerful theory for decision under ambiguity and motivate the experiment of this chapter.
Let us point out one restriction for the results of our study. One of the main conclusions of 
recent experimental research in decision theory is that framing and presentation have a large 
impact on observed decisions. In our experiment we chose the, in our opinion most basic, bi­
nary choice tasks and our stimuli are relatively simple and transparent. Therefore the common 
outcomes in our stimuli were transparent. An interesting question is to what degree the results 
of our study can be affected by different presentations of the stimuli, in particular if  those 
presentations conceal common outcomes. This question has been studied in further detail by 
Weber and Kirsner (1997) and is discussed in Section 4 below.
1. Testing RDU: the theoretical design of the experiment
In decision theory, preferences are taken as the observable primitives of the theory, and theo­
ries are ultimately characterized by axioms defined on these preferences. The central axiom of 
decision under ambiguity as formulated by Savage (1954) is the sure-thing principle2: If two
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gambles share an event that yields the same outcome, then this common outcome should not 
matter for the decision. That is, subjects should behave as if  they "cancel" the common 
outcome prior to making their choice. Consequently, the preference between these gambles 
should not be affected if we change the common outcome.
It can be shown that the essential difference between RDU and EU comes down to a 
weakening of the sure-thing principle (STP) to the case where the gambles are "comonotonic." 
All other differences between EU and RDU are, in a way, non-essential (for a precise 
formulation see Wakker, 1996). Two gambles are comonotonic if  they induce the same order 
on the events according to the favorability of the outcomes. This condition will be explained by 
an example, also introducing the kind of stimuli that were used in the experiment.
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Gamble R 2 7 12
Gamble S 3 5 12
Figure 1. Two gambles, R and S. Common outcome equals 12.
Figure 1 presents two gambles. Amounts are dutch guilders ($1 equals about HFl 1.65). 
The gamble with the larger spread of outcomes is denoted by R (risky), the other one by S 
(safe). For gamble R, the best outcome, 12, is obtained under event 3. Event 2 yields the sec­
ond best outcome, 7, and event 1 the worst outcome, 2. The same order on the events is in­
duced by the rank-order of the outcomes of gamble S, as is easily verified. If we construct two 
gambles R' and S' on the same events (Figure 2) by changing the common outcome on event 3 
from $12 to $8, then this pair of gambles is again comonotonic.
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Gamble R' 2 7 8
Gamble S' 3 5 8
Figure 2. Common outcome equals 8.
Moreover, the change of the common outcome does not change the rank order in compari­
son to the original gambles. Therefore any pair of these four gambles is comonotonic; they all 
induce the same rank-ordering on the events. In this case, where all gambles are pairwise 
comonotonic, the comonotonic STP  applies. It forbids a preference reversal for the choices in 
Figure 1 and 2: only the preferences R and R' or the preferences S and S' are allowed.
Next consider a change of the common outcome from $8 to $4 (Figure 3). Now event 2 
has become the best event instead of event 3. In this case, the gambles R'' and S'' induce a dif­
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ferent rank-ordering on events than the gambles R' and S'. The four gambles are not pairwise 
comonotonic, therefore the comonotonic STP does not apply. RDU now allows each of the 
four possible patterns of preferences.
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Gamble R'' 2 7 4
Gamble S'' 3 5 4
Figure 3. Common outcome equals 4.
The choices in Figures 2 and 3 provide a test of the STP that will be called non-comonotonic.
If the axiomatic difference between EU and RDU lies in the difference between the STP 
and the comonotonic STP, then the critical empirical test of RDU is to compare the violation­
rate of the STP with the violation-rate of the comonotonic STP. If RDU has any additional 
value to EU then there must be systematic violations of the non-comonotonic STP. 
Consequently, the violation-rate of the non-comonotonic STP then should be higher than the 
violation-rate of the comonotonic STP. The main goal of the experiment is to test this hy­
pothesis.
An additional part of the design introduces tests of RDU in combination with particular 
weighting functions. The explanation of these tests is more formal and is described next. First 
we introduce some notation. The RD U  value of a gamble yielding Xi if event Ei (i = 1, 2, 3) 
occurs can be written as:
n iU (X i) + n2U(X2) + * 3^ X 3), (1)
where the n's are the "decision weights" (and subscripts refer to events). They depend on the 
rank-order of the outcomes. If Xi X2 X3, the decision weights are defined as follows:
n 1 = W (E1), n2 = W (E1*E2) -  W (E1) and n3 = 1 -  W (E1*E2);
here, W is the weighting function. W assigns value 1 to the universal event, value 0 to the 
impossible event, and satisfies W(A) W(B) whenever A contains B.
We can now demonstrate formally that RDU cannot explain a change of preference if  the 
common outcome changes from 8 to 12, as discussed above: The change from 8 to 12 does not 
affect the rank-ordering of outcomes, hence the decision weights do not change. One easily 
verifies that preferences then cannot reverse.3 This proves that RDU implies the comonotonic 
STP. Next we consider tests of the non-comonotonic STP. Here the general RDU model does 
not impose restrictions, for decision weights can change and no conclusions can be drawn.
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If we specify characteristics of the weighting function, however, additional restrictions are 
implied. We derive these restrictions using again the example from the experiment. First we 
discuss the change of common outcome from 0 to 4, next from 4 to 8. Suppose a subject 
prefers R''' to S''' in the choice-question depicted in Figure 4.
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Gamble Rm 2 7 0
Gamble S'" 3 5 0
Figure 4. Common outcome equals 0.
This implies that the RDU value of R''' exceeds the RDU value of S''':
niU(2) + n2U(7) + n 3U(0) > niU(3) + n2U(5) + n3U(0)
where the decision weights n i, ft2, n  are explained next. For R''' and S''', the highest 
outcome is obtained under event E2 and therefore its decision weight n2 is W(E2). Event Ei 
yields the second-highest outcome, therefore n i is W (Ei~E2) -  W (E2). Finally, event E3 
yields the worst outcome and therefore n 3 is i -  W (E i~ E 2). The above formula can be 
rewritten as:
K2[U(7) -  U(5)] > ni[U(3) -  U(2)]. (2)
If we change the outcome from 0 to 4 (Figure 3), event i becomes the worst event. Suppose 
that in this case the same subject prefers S'' to R'', implying a violation of the non-comono­
tonic STP. Now the RDU value of S'' exceeds the RDU value of R'':
n2'[U(7) -  U(5)] < n i'[U (3 )-  U(2)], (3)
where n i ' = i -  W (E2~ E 3) and ^ 2' = W (E2) (= ^ 2). This pattern of preferences does not 
constitute a violation of RDU, for it can be explained if n i in (2) is smaller than n i' in (3), so if
W (Ei~E2) -  W(E2) < i -  W(E2*E3).
A weighting function W is concave if for all disjoint events A, B, D,
W(A~B) -  W(B) W(A~B~D) -  W(B~D).
That is, the marginal weight contribution of event B (i.e., its decision weight) becomes smaller 
if  event A is enlarged to A~D. A convex function is defined similarly, with the reversed 
inequality; so then the marginal weight contribution of event B to event A is increasing in A. If
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we substitute E i for A, E2 for B, and E3 for D, then it follows that a concave weighting 
function cannot explain the stated inequality. Thus RDU in combination with a concave 
weighting function cannot explain the above preferences. RDU combined with a convex 
weighting function can explain these preferences, for it predicts that n i in (2) is smaller than or 
equal to n i' in (3). Convexity of the weighting function can be interpreted as modeling 
pessimism. A pessimistic subject predominantly looks at the worst outcome. In Figure 4, the 
common outcome of 0 is the lowest outcome so event 3 receives much attention. If we change 
the common outcome from 0 to 4, event 1 becomes the worst event and receives more attention 
than before. Under event 1, the risky gamble yields 2, whereas the subject receives a better 
outcome, 3, if he chooses the safe gamble. Therefore, the change of the common outcome from
0 to 4 enhances the safe choice, in agreement with the predictions of RDU with a convex 
weighting function.
If we change the common outcome from 4 to 8 (Figure 3 and Figure 2), the common out­
come becomes the best outcome. If W is convex, event 2 will receive a larger decision weight 
than before. In this case the risky choice is enhanced, for the risky gamble yields a larger out­
come on event 2 than the safe gamble. Thus, RDU with a convex weighting function cannot 
model a preference for the gamble R'' in Figure 3 combined with a preference for the gamble 
S' after the change of the common outcome to 8. RDU with a concave weighting function 
precludes the reversed change of preference.
In cumulative prospect theory, the weighting function is S shaped. For decision weights, 
this implies that for good outcomes and for bad outcomes, decision weights in cumulative 
prospect theory are relatively large. Middle outcomes receive relatively small decision weights. 
Recapitulating, we can say that for a convex weighting function the low outcomes receive more 
attention (pessimism), for a concave weighting function the high outcomes receive more 
attention (optimism), and for cumulative prospect theory the extreme outcomes receive more 
attention. Table 1 summarizes all additional restrictions that RDU combined with a particular 
weighting function imposes on our data.
Table 1. Patterns of violations of the non-comonotonic STP (i.e., changes of preference) that contradict RDU 
combined with a weighting function as specified in the columns. Opposite changes can be explained.
rank-order of common outcome event 
changes from: Convex Concave
cum.
theory
prospect
worst 0  middle S 0  R R 0  S 0S R
middle 0  best R 0  S S 0  R S 0 R
2. The Experiment
The experiment was conducted with 60 undergraduate students at the University of Nijmegen, 
mostly majoring in psychology. They were paid according to the random lottery method (see 
Starmer and Sugden, 1991, for comments on its reliability): one of the choice-questions was 
randomly selected at the end, and the choice of the subjects was played out. Besides the lottery,
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yielding maximally Fl 15 (about $9) and minimally nothing, the subjects all received Fl 3 for 
their participation. All preferences were administrated by computer, including the response 
times.
The ambiguous events were generated by three different irregular dice. Each die had six 
different sides, which were grouped into three events by different colors. Colors are used to 
label and identify events, i.e. "red" denotes the event that the die lands red side down. (This 
unusual way of "reading" the event from a die simplified the estimation of probabilities: larger 
sides are more probable than smaller ones.) Subjects received no frequentistic information 
about the dice: they were encouraged to examine the dice, but they were not allowed to throw 
them. We ran an independent experiment (n=10), to get an impression of the perceived 
likelihoods of the events generated by the dice. The results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Means and standard deviations (SD) of the perceived likelihoods.
Die I Die II Die III
White Yellow Grey Green Blue Red Purple Green Yellow
Mean
SD
0.099
0.029
0.242
0.071
0.659
0.075
0.135
0.071
0.186
0.072
0.679
0.113
0.311
0.031
0.304
0.031
0.384
0.041
Two gambles were constructed on the events, called S and R in this chapter, shorthand for safe 
and risky. The subjects were asked to state which of the two gambles they would prefer to play 
if they were given the opportunity to play one of them. No indifferences were allowed.
The test consisted of 36 choice questions. The order of these choice questions was ran­
domized. Three choice questions were replicated in the experiment. These were randomly 
selected and varied from one subject to the other. The replications were added to provide some 
indication of the consistency of the subjects. We also included 9 filler items, where one gamble 
was clearly superior to the other (for any reasonable estimate of the likelihoods of the events). 
The filler items were included in order to motivate subjects to consider their choices carefully. 
Also, these fillers helped to prevent recognition, and successfully so according to the pilot­
study (21 subjects, written evaluation). The test was preceded by twelve training questions to 
avoid learning effects during the test.
The stimuli were chosen according to a number of criteria. The gambles had to be close in 
preference, because we wanted to leave room for changes in preference due to changes of the 
common outcome. For all choice problems we included a small risk premium. All outcomes 
were positive to exclude sign effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
We constructed nine quadruples of choice-questions that were the same except for a 
change of a common outcome. The quadruples are called sets henceforth, and are denoted by A 
,.., I (see Tables 3-5). For example, the safe gamble in the first gamble pair of set A, denoted 
by (2, White; 2, Yellow; 0, Grey), yields 2 if die I lands white down, 2 if  die I lands yellow
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down, and O if die I lands grey down. The risky gamble in the first gamble pair of set
Table 3. Sets of gambles generated by die I. The underlined common outcomes yield gamble pairs that provide a 
test of the comonotonic STP.
Set of gambles S/R White Yellow Grey (Common outcome)
Safe 2 2
A O 2 4 6
Risky O 3
Safe 1O 1O
B O 5 1O 15
Risky 5 12
Safe 4 9
C O 4 8 12
Risky O 11
Table 4. Sets of gambles generated by die II.
Set of gambles S/R Green Blue Red (Common outcome)
Safe 5 5
D 1 3 5 7
Risky 7 4
Safe 2 8
E O 4 8 12
Risky O 12
Safe 2 3
F O 3 6 9
Risky O 6
Table 5. Sets of gambles generated by die III.
Set of gambles S/R Purple Green Yellow (Common outcomes)
Safe 3 5
G O 4 8 12
Risky 2 7
Safe 8 3
H O 4 8 12
Risky 12 O
Safe 6 6
I O 3 6 9
Risky 9 4
A is (O, White; 3, Yellow; O, Grey). The other three gamble pairs of set A are the same, except 
that the common outcome for grey is replaced by another common outcome (2,4, and 6, 
respectively). The other sets in Table 3,4,5 are defined similarly, but Table 4 refers to die II 
and Table 5 to die III. Set G of Table 5 was already illustrated in Figures 1-4.
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For comparability, we changed the common outcome always by the same amount. One 
change of the common outcome yielded a test of the comonotonic STP, the other two changes 
provided tests of the non-comonotonic STP.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions concerning the pre­
sentation of the items. These conditions were included because we wanted to control for arte­
facts due to presentation effects.
White Yellow Grey
Option A ü 4 ü 9 ü 4
Option B ü 0 ü 11 ü 4
Figure 5. The matrix condition.
The matrix-condition presented the gambles in rows and the events in columns (Figure 5). 
The graphic condition presented colored two-dimensional "snapshots" of the die with the out­
comes plotted on the sides (Figure 6).
The other two conditions were almost identical, both using a verbal description of the 
gambles. In the verbal condition, each gamble had a column that first stated the event followed 
by its outcome (Figure 7). The verbal-collapsed condition was the same, except that if two out­
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comes were the same, the events were grouped, e.g. "White and Grey Side: Fl 4" (Figure 8). 
For all conditions, the positioning (top/bottom) of the R and S gamble was randomized over 
subjects.
Figure 7. The verbal condition.
White and Grey side: 4 
Yellow side: 9
CZZ)
White side: 0
Yellow side: 11
Grey side: 4
d 1
Figure 8. The verbal-collapsed condition.
3. Results
Our main hypothesis states that if  we change the common outcome, subjects will violate the 
STP less often if the change is comonotonic, then if it is non-comonotonic. The null-hypothesis 
assumes, to the contrary, that comonotonicity has no effect, i.e. violations of the STP are as
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likely for non-comonotonic cases as for comonotonic cases. As all sets of items (A-I, Tables 3­
5) offered one comonotonic change and two non-comonotonic changes of the common 
outcome, the null-hypothesis predicts that in our data there will be twice as many violations of 
the non-comonotonic STP as of the comonotonic STP.
Table 6. Violations of the STP and violations of RDU, combined with a particular weighting function.
Condition Comono­
tonic STP
Non-Com.
STP
STP Convex Concave CumulativeProspect
Theory
Matrix 24 55 79 27 28 28
Verbal 36 70 106 42 28 39
Graphic 30 73 103 37 36 39
Collapsed 50 90 140 54 36 41
Total 140 288 428 160 128 147
The left half of Table 6 shows that our expectation was invalidated. We found no effect of 
comonotonicity (p=.41, binomial).
Some violations of the STP will be due to inconsistency on behalf of the subjects. A com­
parison with the inconsistency-rate of replications gives an indication if  there are also sys­
tematic violations of EU. The null-hypothesis states that all violations are due to inconsisten­
cies. If we take the variability between subjects into account, the null-hypothesis cannot be 
rejected: the inconsistency-rate of 0.283, and the violation-rate of 0.264 are essentially equal in 
a paired comparison (t(59)= -.57, p=.714, one-tailed). It seems that observed violations of the 
STP should be explained by random inconsistencies of the subjects. The inconsistency rate of 
about 30% is not uncommon in choice experiments (Camerer, 1989). While strict inconsistency 
is a form of irrationality, in our experiment there may be a more rational explanation for part of 
the observed inconsistencies: The gambles were designed to be close in preference, so it could 
well be that subjects were more or less indifferent between several gambles and then would 
choose randomly.
The design of the experiment also allowed us to investigate which functional forms of the 
weighting function performed best: convex, concave, or S-shaped. The results are presented in 
the right half of Table 6. RDU with a concave weighting function performed best. This is quite 
remarkable, as it deviates from common findings reported in other experimental papers 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994; Wu, 1994) and is also contrary 
to our expectations that subjects would be ambiguity averse for the kind of events we em­
ployed. However, the difference between violation-rates of concave and convex RDU are not 
significant if  we take between-subject variability into account (t(59) = 1.51, p = .135). Besides, 
there is also reason to believe that the success of the concave functional can be partly explained 
by a side-effect found in the verbal-collapsed condition, to which we will turn later. The
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patterns of preferences we have found here also fall perfectly well within the range of what may 
be expected if violations of the STP are only random inconsistencies.
We expected that there would be no large differences between the conditions, for all the 
conditions gave the same information in a reasonably transparent manner. However, there were 
some significant differences, summarized in Table 7.
Table 7. Comparison of mean values. Within columns, Ys significantly different from *, using Tukey's HSD 
at the .05 level.
Condition
Violations of STP 
(Out of a possible 
27)
Inconsistencies 
(Out of a possible
3)
Mean Time (Sec) % Risky
Matrix 5.27Y 0.60 16.62 40.9
Verbal 7.07 0.40Y 18.66 41.5
Graphic 6.87 1.13* 16.92 41.3
Verbal-Collapsed 9.33* 1.27* 21.97 46.5
There seems to be a significant and straightforward relation between the transparency of the 
presentation and the coherence and response-time of the choices. The matrix condition, and to a 
smaller degree the verbal and graphic conditions, promote cancelling of the common outcome. 
Hence we observe a much smaller rate of violations of the STP here than in the verbal- 
collapsed condition, where common outcomes need not be transparently displayed. The in­
consistency-rate and response time are also much larger in the verbal-collapsed condition, in­
dicating that the verbal-collapsed condition is more difficult, yielding more inconsistencies.
The high rate of violations of the STP in the verbal-collapsed condition can also be partly 
explained by an interesting phenomenon that is due to collapsing. The collapsing effect asserts 
(in the context of gains) that if  the common outcome collapses with an outcome of one of the 
gambles, then this gamble becomes less attractive. This biases violations of the STP, for if 
there is a choice-question where one gamble has an outcome that collapses with the common 
outcome, the collapsing effect predicts that subjects will be biased in favor of the gamble that 
has no collapse (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Starmer & Sugden, 1989b). The intuitive 
rationale of this effect seems to be that because there are fewer distinct outcomes when there is 
a collapse, the gamble appears to be less attractive visually  (see Figure 6). A similar 
phenomenon is described in support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994), where "unpacking" an 
event enhances its perceived likelihood.
If a gamble has only one outcome besides the common outcome (as happens in sets 
A,B,D, and I) then collapsing introduces a certain outcome, and a certainty effect (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) can be induced. In such cases, we cannot test for collapsing properly be­
cause the certainty effect interferes. Therefore, collapses that introduce a certain outcome have 
been ignored in the analysis.
52
A Test o f Rank-Dependent Utility
We found significant collapsing effects in the verbal-collapsed condition. The collapsing 
effect predicts that there will be additional violations of the STP because a gamble with a col­
lapsed common outcome is less attractive. For each individual the number of violations of the 
STP agreeing with the collapsing effect, and the number of violations disagreeing, were de­
termined. A paired sample t-test showed a significant effect (t(14)=3.29, p<.01). The hypoth­
esis that there is no difference between the direction of violations predicted by the collapsing 
effect between the verbal-collapsed condition and the other conditions could also be rejected 
(F(1,58)=8.70, p<.01). The finding of a collapsing effect suggests that subjects are more sen­
sitive to seemingly innocuous and, according to EU, irrelevant variations in presentation than 
they are to comonotonicity.
The program that administrated the choices also registered the response-time. Although the 
experiment was not designed to test explicit hypotheses concerning response-times, some 
points can be made. For instance, we observed that there were significant differences between 
mean response times on items constructed on the three different dice.4 This indicates that 
subjects were sensitive to differences in the source of ambiguity.
It is plausible to suppose a connection between strength of preference and response-time. 
If the subject has a strong preference, he will find the choice-problem easy and will answer 
quickly. If the subject is more or less indifferent between the two gambles, he will need more 
time to consider all relevant aspects of the available gambles. This is our main working hy­
pothesis concerning response-times. Given this hypothesis, we can investigate the explanation 
that part of the inconsistencies and thus part of the violations of the STP are caused by 
indifference. If subjects are indifferent between two gambles, the chance at violations of the 
STP and at violations of consistency on replications will increase. Hence these chances will be 
positively correlated with response-time. Table 8 shows that subjects indeed used significantly 
more response-time in the inconsistent choices.5
Table 8. Mean response-times (in seconds) and the probability of obtaining these differences (or larger), on the 
assumption that mean times are equal.
Violating pairs Verifying pairs Significance
Test of Consistency 21.74 18.18 .045
Test of STP 21.57 17.93 .000
We also investigated which factors determine the response-times of individual items. Most 
of the variance (25%) could be explained by differences between subjects (predicting a re­
sponse-time by the mean of the response times of the subject that gave the response). There are 
large differences between overall speed: the average time to make a choice was 18.5 seconds, 
with a large standard deviation of 6.4 seconds. Some of this variability (16%) can be explained 
by risk-attitude. Subjects who are relatively risk-averse (more then 50% safe choices) are also 
relatively quick. This could point to the use of quick heuristics leading to safe choices.
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If we look at differences between items, we can also obtain predictive power concerning 
response-time. The most predictive component, additional to within-subject differences, was 
the order of the item in the sequence (multiple regression, additional R2=.065, p<.01). At the 
beginning, subjects took much more time to answer a question than later on. In spite of a 
training session of twelve questions, we still found a strong learning effect. The second item- 
characteristic that yields predictive power is, interestingly, the choice itself, i.e. whether the 
choice is risky or safe (additional R2=.0065, p<.01). Given our working hypothesis, we might 
expect a curved relationship with its peak at the .5 risk-percentage. We found, however, that on 
the average, subjects take more time to give a risky than a safe choice.6 This may be explained 
by a justification process: it is easier to justify a safe then a risky choice.
4. Discussion
The test that we employed provides a critical test of rank-dependent utility. The experiment 
suggests that the general RDU model does not provide descriptive improvement over EU. We 
found no evidence that subjects are sensitive to comonotonicity for decision under ambiguity. 
The same was found for decision under risk by Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994).
Even if the general RDU model does not provide a descriptive improvement, more restric­
tive submodels may still be found that are of descriptive use. In that case, there will be rela­
tively few violations of the non-comonotonic STP that are excluded by such a submodel (and 
relatively many that are permitted). In other words, the loss in accuracy is then outweighed by 
the gain in parsimony. Previous studies have suggested that RDU with an S-shaped weighting 
function can be of interest (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996; Wakker, Erev 
& Weber, 1994), and that the S-shape will be more pronounced for ambiguity than for risk 
(Tversky & Fox, 1995). Our experiment, however, does not confirm these results. It seems 
that the data of this experiment could best be described as produced by a noisy EU-maximizer 
(Hey & Orme, 1994).
Some dependencies on presentation were apparent in our study. The different presentation 
modes that we used (in particular the verbal-collapsed presentation) affected the rate of vio­
lations of the sure-thing principle to a significant degree. Not very surprisingly, consistency, 
and therefore violation-rates of the STP, are affected by the complexity of presentation. The 
effect-size that we found with seemingly trivial variation in presentation indicates a dependence 
of choice on presentation that is worrisome. Also, we found a significant collapsing effect. 
That is, by presenting events with the same outcomes in a collapsed manner, the gamble 
becomes less attractive. This effect is not related to likelihood or outcomes, but to presentation 
only, and therefore difficult to accommodate in the present EU like theories.
By incorporating additional stages in decision theory that depend on the presentation of the 
gambles and precede a EU or RDU like evaluation, we might be able to give a better description 
of preferences. First, a subadditive evaluation of collapsed events, decreasing the decision 
weight of such an event, can explain the collapsing effect. This process is very similar to the
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subadditive evaluation o f 'packed' hypotheses formalized in support theory (Tversky & 
Koehler, 1994). Second, we might introduce an editing operation where transparently coded 
common outcomes are cancelled (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Wu, 1994, finds positive 
evidence for such an operation, while Li, 1994, reports negative findings). This cancellation 
operation sheds a different light on our negative findings. If subjects always cancel common 
outcomes, RDU 'cum cancellation' is untested by the current design. Additional stages in the 
theory, however, come at a price. They yield more descriptive qualities but weaken elegance 
and the predictive power of the theory.
The effects of variations in presentation modes on the performance of rank-dependent 
utility is a topic for further research. Weber and Kirsner (1997) addressed the question to what 
degree rank-dependence can be enhanced by presentation. By highlighting the highest or the 
lowest outcome of the gambles they enhanced optimistic and pessimistic choice making, 
respectively. Such modes of evaluation induce violations of the non-comonotonic STP. They 
also considered buying and selling tasks, where subjects can face losses so that loss-aversion 
effects can occur. This increases pessimism and therefore also induces rank-dependency. 
Weber and Kirsner showed that these representational manipulations can generate significant 
rank-dependence.
Overall, our findings are negative. Taking EU and RDU as they have been axiomatized, 
we do not find evidence for rank-dependency. We do think that RDU can be of descriptive 
value in specific domains of decision making. In our opinion, RDU yields an elegant manner 
for modeling preferences if the certainty or possibility effect applies. Also, multi-outcome 
gambles can easily be too complicated to be evaluated in an EU like style. It seems natural that 
in such cases people need to group outcomes to evaluate these gambles more easily (Lopes, 
1987). A very likely grouping in best, worst and intermediate outcome-groups is essentially 
rank-dependent, providing high hopes for descriptive success of RDU. The identification of 
special domains of application of RDU is a topic for future research.
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1This interpretation is based on a two stage approach to ambiguity. In the first stage probabilities are estimated, 
in the second stage they are transformed into decision weights. Both stages can generate non-additivity (two-fac­
tor model, Tversky & Fox, 1994, Tversky & Wakker, 1995).
2 Combined with usual continuity assumptions, the STP is equivalent to independence for the context of risk 
(Fishburn & Wakker, 1995).
3 Cancel common terms TC3Ü(8) and TC3Ü(12), respectively, in the RDU formula.
4 Mean response times were 16.04 sec for die I, 19.68 sec for die II, and 21.21 sec for die III. The null-hypothe- 
sis stating that mean times are equal could be rejected (F(2,58)=35.73, p<.001)).
5 There is a risk of contamination here, due to the influence of base-rates. Safe choices were more frequent, so 
there will be more consistent pairs of choices that are both safe. Mean response times for safe choices were also
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less than for risky choices. This implies that the response-times of consistent pairs of choices will be less than 
for inconsistent pairs. However, the large base-rate of safe choices cannot explain the magnitude of the differ­
ences reported. Based on the mean times and base-rates for safe and risky choices, a mean time for consistent 
pairs of 18.88 sec is predicted and a mean time of 19.33 sec for inconsistent pairs.
6 Because the mean time of subjects was already entered as a predictor, the predictive value of the answer does 
not reflect differences between subjects but purely differences within subjects.
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Abstract.
This chapter investigates the shape of the utility function for losses. From a rational point of 
view it can be argued that utility should be concave. Empirically, measurements of the utility 
for losses show mixed results but most evidence supports convex rather than concave utilities. 
However, these measurements use methods that are either biased by the certainty effect or 
require complex parametrical estimations. This chapter re-examines utility for losses, avoiding 
the mentioned pitfalls by using the tradeoff method. We find that utility for losses is convex. 
This is contrary to common assumption in the economics literature. Also, we investigate prop­
erties of the tradeoff method showing a new violation of procedure invariance. Our findings 
demonstrate that diminishing sensitivity is an important phenomenon for utility elicitation.
Key words: utility elicitation, prospect theory, tradeoff, risk aversion, diminishing sensitiv­
ity, procedure invariance.
Fennema, Hein & Marcel A. L. M. van Assen. (1998). "Measuring the Utility of Losses by Means 
of the Tradeoff Method," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 17, 277-295.
58
Measuring the Utility o f Losses
For economists it is a truism that the utility of money is marginally decreasing, and therefore 
that utility is concave (Bentham, 1789; Marshall, 1920; Samuelson, 1937; Pratt, 1964). Empir­
ically, this has indeed been well established for gains (Friend & Blume, 1975; Cohn, Lewellen, 
Lease, & Schlarbaum, 1975; W olf & Pohlman, 1983; Szpiro, 1986). For losses the situation is 
less clear. Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1992) has suggested the very op­
posite of classical economics for losses, that is, utility is convex rather than concave. We first 
review the experimental literature concerning the shape of utility for losses. As will be shown, 
most measurements done so far indicate a convex utility for losses but the evidence is not con­
clusive. Hence for losses one of the most basic aspects of utility, that is, whether marginal util­
ity is increasing or decreasing, is as yet an unsettled question.
A major difficulty lies in the very measurement of utility. Experimental research in 
decision making shows that responses to choice problems are affected by many factors not 
covered by expected utility theory. One major deviation from expected utility was shown as 
early as Allais (1953): people are very attracted to sure gains compared to risky prospects 
(certainty effect). This implies that the most widely used methods for utility elicitation, the 
certainty equivalence and probability equivalence methods (Farquhar, 1984), will yield biased 
utilities because these methods are based on expected utility (Hershey, Kunreuther & 
Schoemaker, 1982; Hershey & Schoemaker, 1985; Johnson & Schkade, 1989). McCord and 
de Neufville (1986) proposed a utility elicitation method that avoids the certainty effect. Their 
method is, however, still prone to probability distortion, another deviation from expected 
utility.
To side-step the described biases we measure the utility of losses assuming Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT), introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992); a similar theory was 
developed by Luce and Fishburn (1991) and Starmer and Sugden (1989a). CPT retains the fa­
miliar reference point of original prospect theory thus permitting losses to be treated differently 
than gains. CPT generalizes expected utility by allowing (rank-dependent) probability distor­
tions, thus accommodating major empirical deviations from expected utility such as the cer­
tainty effect, the common consequence effect and the common ratio effect. CPT also allows 
distortion of probabilities to depend on the sign of the outcome (sign-dependence). Because of 
the above characteristics, CPT allows for a considerable improvement of utility elicitation.
Assuming more complex models like CPT does not solve problems concerning utility 
elicitation by itself. To derive a utility from a certainty equivalence or probability equivalence 
method assuming CPT avoids biases due to the certainty effect, but introduces the problem that 
a weighting function must be known to measure utility (and vice versa). By simultaneously es­
timating both functions, a utility can be derived but this involves statistically complicated esti­
mations under parametrical assumptions concerning both functions.
To avoid problems concerning parametrical assumptions and estimation procedures, we 
adopted the tradeoff method (TO method; Wakker & Deneffe, 1996) to elicit utility. This
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method allows utility elicitation without knowledge or special assumptions about the weighting 
function. This method is also valid for other theories that transform probabilities, such as origi­
nal prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), transformation of fixed outcome probabil­
ities (Edwards, 1962), rank-dependent transformation (Quiggin, 1982), and prospective refer­
ence theory (Viscusi, 1989). Since the TO method has been developed only recently, we give a 
self-contained presentation in the second section. The second section also describes two differ­
ent TO procedures that were employed to further study the robustness of the TO method. The 
third section reports results, showing convexity for losses and a new violation of procedure in­
variance. First, we turn to a discussion of evidence and arguments concerning the utility of 
losses presently available in the literature.
1. History
Describing the origins of the concept of utility, Stigler (1950, p. 63) notes that 'the principle 
that equal increments of utility-producing means (such as income or bread) yield diminishing 
increments of utility is a commonplace'. In other words, an amount of money (say $100) is of 
more value to the pauper than to the millionaire. This principle of diminishing marginal utility 
provides a rational argument for concave utility. The concept of concave utility was introduced 
as early as Cramer (1728) and Bernoulli (1738) to explain commonly found behavior in the St. 
Petersburg paradox. In expected utility theory a concave utility explains commonly observed 
risk-averse behavior. Concave utility is also required in Debreu's (1959) derivation of equilib­
ria for economic transactions.
Since the introduction of prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) it is also a 
commonplace that people evaluate decisions with respect to a reference point (usually the status 
quo), allowing them to frame decisions in terms of gains and losses (see also Markowitz, 1952; 
Edwards, 1954b; Laughhunn, Payne, & Crum, 1980). With respect to the value of outcomes, 
the distinction between gains and losses is central in prospect theory. First, it yields the means 
to model the well-established phenomenon of loss aversion ('losses loom larger than gains'). 
Second, but more important for our purpose, it permits to conjecture that the utility (or 'value') 
of losses is convex rather than concave. This contradiction between the hypothesis of prospect 
theory and the economic prediction based on diminishing marginal utility calls for an empirical 
investigation.
Although expected utility theory with a concave utility1 has been the leading theory in de­
cision making since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), utility functions have not been 
measured extensively (Stigler, 1950; Farquhar, 1984). In particular the utility of losses has re­
ceived little attention. Moreover, the few experiments investigating the shape of the utility func­
tion for losses show diverse results, to which we turn next.
Using small amounts of money, Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957) found 3 concave, 7 
convex, and 5 linear utility functions for losses. Officer and Halter (1968) tested the utility of 
the cost of fodder reserves for five farmers. Two farmers showed a convex utility for losses,
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two farmers showed a concave utility function, and one farmer had a utility that was nearly lin­
ear. Green (1963) elicited utility for four managers in large chemical companies. All four 
showed concave utilities for losses. Swalm (1966) elicited the utilities for gains and losses for 
'about 100' executives. The paper reports only a non-random selection of 13 cases, the major­
ity (10) of which showed convex utilities for losses. Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) reana­
lyzed 26 cases from various previous papers, including the 13 reported cases of Swalm (1966). 
Their conclusion that the majority of functions are convex for losses is therefore heavily based 
on the selection made by Swalm. Besides that, still 10 cases (38%) reviewed in their paper 
showed a concave utility function for losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) refer to these re­
sults when they present their well-known value function; no new experimental evidence is 
provided.
Besides being far from conclusive, the above reports are biased in favor of convexity. 
Measurements were done using the certainty equivalence and probability equivalence methods 
that are biased because expected utility was assumed (cf. Farquhar, 1984). These methods re­
quire a gamble on the one hand and a sure outcome on the other such that the subject is indif­
ferent between both. For example, a subject may be indifferent between a prospect that yields a 
50% probability of losing $100 or else nothing and a sure loss of $40. In these situations it is 
well known that the attractiveness of the gamble is enhanced because it gives at least a chance 
of breaking even, instead of a choice for a sure loss.2 For losses, the certainty effect therefore 
enhances risk seeking.3 If we correct for this certainty effect, preferences that can be explained 
by expected utility with a convex utility may also be compatible with a linear or even concave 
utility for losses, depending on the magnitude of the certainty effect. Therefore, many experi­
ments that find risk seeking for losses (e.g. Libby & Fishburn, 1977; Laughhunn, Payne & 
Crum, 1980; Currim & Sarin, 1989; Erev & Wallsten 1993) do not necessarily imply that sub­
jects show convex utilities for losses.
Recently, Tversky & Kahneman (1992) found evidence for convexity of the utility for 
losses. They corrected for the certainty effect by assuming CPT and simultaneously estimating 
utility and weighting functions. Their procedure has the disadvantage that parametric assump­
tions concerning both functions are needed. They report no individual, but only aggregated re­
sults. Based on the median parametric estimate for the utility they conclude that the utility of 
losses is convex for most subjects tested. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) simultaneously fitted utility 
and weighting functions in a way that is not restricted to specific parametric families. Their 
study also reports mainly convex utilities. Shortly after we performed our study, Abdellaoui 
(1999) measured the utility of losses using the TO method, also reporting mainly convex utility 
for losses.
If a convex utility for losses is not considered rational but still is accepted as the common 
utility in prospect theory, an explanation is needed. The explanation offered by Kahneman and 
Tversky is based on diminishing sensitivity. This phenomenon is well known in psycho­
physics: a (physically) constant difference between stimuli is more easily detected near the
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natural reference point than farther away from it. It causes psychological sensitivity functions 
to, for example, auditory stimuli to be concave. A compelling example of diminishing sensitiv­
ity when applied to the perception of monetary values can be found in Savage (1954). Savage 
describes the event of a man buying a car. The man wants to buy a car at $2,134.56 and is 
tempted to buy the car with a radio installed at $2,228.41, 'feeling that the difference is tri­
fling'. However, reflecting that if  he already had the car, he would certainly not pay $93.85 for 
the radio, he decides not to buy the radio. This change of preference can obviously not be ra­
tionally explained in terms of final wealth. Rather does it show that the perceived difference 
between $0 and $93.85 is larger than the perceived difference between $2,134.56 and 
$2,228.41. For losses, a similar argument can be given: the larger the loss, the more trivial a 
small increase of the loss appears. So it is plausible that the perception of numbers, rather than 
intrinsic value, causes measurements of utility for losses to be convex.
2. The Tradeoff Method
First CPT is briefly described, restricted to the types of prospects that will be considered in this 
chapter. In all cases probabilities are given and there are at most two outcomes. A prospect is 
denoted by (x1,p1; x2,p2) yielding $xi with probability pi. Because there are only two out­
comes, p2 equals 1—px but for consistency of notation we maintain p2. The CPT value of a 
prospect is the sum of separate evaluations of gains and losses, that are both rank-dependent 
(Quiggin, 1982). That is, weighting functions w+ and w— are defined for probabilities 
associated with gains and losses, respectively. In case of a mixed prospect, where x 1>0>x2, 
the CPT value is given by
w+(p1) u(x1) + w—(p2) u(x2) (1)
The CPT value of a positive prospect, where x 1 x2 0, is given by
w+(p1) u(x1) + [w+(p 1 + p2) — w+(p1)] u(x2) (2)
and the CPT value of a negative prospect, where x 1<x2<0, is given by
w—(p 1) u(x1) + [w—(p 1 + p2) — w—(p1)] u(x2) (3)
Note that these formulas all agree with original Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), so that our analysis and experiment apply to this theory as well. As usual, weighting 
functions are increasing with w—(0) = w+ (0) = 0 and w—(1) = w+(1) = 1. Next we show 
how, assuming CPT, the TO method elicits utility without requiring any assumptions about the 
form of the weighting functions (details and proofs are offered by Wakker and Deneffe, 1996).
The subject's task is to choose between two prospects (see Figure 1) that are both defined 
on the same events E 1 (upper branch) and E2 (lower branch) having probabilities p 1 (1/3) and
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p2 (2/3) respectively. If event E 1 occurs prospect the right prospect yields more money than the 
left (an additional $500 in the example). If E2 occurs, the left prospect yields a smaller loss than 
the right. So, the task for the subject is essentially to make a tradeoff: does the extra money that 
the right prospect yields in case of E 1 outweigh the smaller loss that the left prospect yields in 
case of E2?
Figure 1. A stimulus used in the outward TO procedure for losses.
The free value (labeled '?' in Figure 1) is varied in order to find the preference switching 
point. For example, if  the free value is —$26, the possibility of losing one additional dollar (if 
one chooses the right prospect) in case E2 occurs can be easily outweighed by the chance of re­
ceiving an additional $500 if E 1 occurs. If the additional loss of the right prospect in event E2 is 
increased, at some point the tradeoff will turn in favor of the left prospect. Let us assume, for 
example, that the preference switching point where the subject is indifferent between the left 
and right prospect lies at —$60.
The first indifference point by itself does not give any clear information about the utility 
function, because the choices made depend crucially on how the subject transforms the proba­
bilities of both events. It tells us that the CPT value of the left prospect equals the CPT value of 
the right, which, by applying (1), results in the following equation
w+(p1)[u($2000)—u($1500)] = w—(p2) [u(—$25) — u(—$60)] (4)
Exact information about the utility function becomes available with the responses to the 
subsequent questions. For the second question the experimenter changes the —$25 value of the 
left prospect, for example to the amount of money that was the preference switching value in 
the first series, —$60 (see Figure 2). The preference switching value of the new question may 
then be at —$100, leading to the following equality based on CPT:
w+(p1)[u($2000)—u($1500)] = w—(p2) [u(—$60) — u(—$100)] (5)
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Figure 2. A second example from the outward TO procedure for losses.
Combining (4) and (5) and dropping the common factor w—(p2), it can be seen that
u(—$25) — u(—$60) = u(—$60) — u(—$100) (6)
The procedure proceeds by replacing the value —$60 by —$100 in the left prospect in Figure 2. 
The subject may now be indifferent between the left and the right prospect if, for example, the 
value —$150 is substituted for the question mark in the right gamble. This would reveal that for 
the subject the utility difference between —$100 and —$150 is equal to both utility differences in 
(6). A series of such questions can be asked, each time replacing the value set by the experi­
menter with the preference switching value given by the subject in the previous question. In 
this way, we can measure a series of monetary values that are equally spaced in utility units. 
Note that the TO-procedure is chained, in the sense that an answer given by the subject is used 
as input in the next question.
Because the intervals thus generated are increasingly farther away from the reference 
point, this procedure is called the outward TO procedure. The TO method can be modified such
Figure 3. An example of a stimulus from the inward TO procedure for losses.
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that a series of intervals is generated that goes towards zero as the procedure progresses. In this 
case, a tradeoff has to be made where the right prospect is fixed and the left prospect has a free 
value that is varied to find the preference switching point (see Figure 3). This is called an in­
ward TO procedure.
The equalities that are derived are independent of w+ and w—. The only assumption to be 
made is that subjects do not change the 'weighting' of the probabilities p 1 and p2 during the ex­
periment, an assumption that must be made for any elicitation procedure. Other requirements of 
the application of the TO method assuming CPT can be satisfied by a proper choice of stimuli. 
First, the outcomes associated with E 1 of both prospects must have the same sign, as well as 
the outcomes associated with E2. (The inward TO procedure therefore stops if the next mone­
tary interval passes zero.) Also, the rank-order of the outcomes of both prospects may not 
change during the process. This is satisfied in the example because the outcomes associated 
with E 1 are positive ($1500 and $2000) and therefore are always the preferred outcomes.
3. The Experiment
The experiment was conducted with 64 undergraduate students at the University of Nijmegen, 
most of whom were majoring in psychology. The actual number of subjects was 68, but the 
data of 4 subjects were discarded. The data of three subjects clearly indicated that they had not 
understood the instructions. One subject did not finish the experiment. The experiment was ran 
individually in two separate sessions (a single session would be strenuous).4 The first session 
took about 50 minutes. The second session took less time (about 40 minutes), because the in­
struction was shortened and the subjects were more experienced at the task. Subjects were paid 
a fee of Hfl 15 for participation (about $8). Some subjects preferred course credit instead of 
money.
We used hypothetical payoffs; the responses of the subjects did not affect the reward sub­
jects received for participation. We would prefer using real incentives. The obvious problem is 
that the experiment involves losses. We could first give subjects money such that losses would 
be covered, but then a considerable part of the subjects would probably treat this money as 
'house' money which distorts the responses (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Other solutions also 
introduce income effects. In addition, studies using real incentives yield results very similar to 
studies using hypothetical payoffs (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer, 1995; Beattie & 
Loomes, 1997). Given the many problems for real incentives for losses, the virtually general 
finding of no difference between real and hypothetical payment in individual choice under risk, 
and the importance of settling the nature of marginal utility for losses, we have decided to carry 
out our experiment without using real incentives.
Each subject completed a utility measurement procedure for gains and losses, in separate 
sessions, with the order counterbalanced. Each session consisted of three parts, all combined 
with an introduction. The first part was an outward TO procedure consisting of four chained 
questions. The starting prospects that were used are illustrated in Figures 1 (losses) and 4
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(gains), except that the values in the experiment were Dutch guilders instead of dollars ($1 
equals about Hfl 2). The starting value of the series (—Hfl 25 for losses, Hfl 200 for gains) is 
labeled TO0; revealed preference switching values are labeled TO1 to TO4, respectively.
Figure 4. The stimulus used in the outward TO procedure for gains.
In the second part of a session a biserial certainty equivalence (CE) method was applied. The 
subject had to find a preference switching value (i.e. the certainty equivalent) such that he or 
she was indifferent between obtaining this value for sure or obtaining the prospect (TO4 , 0.5; 
TO0 , 0.5). This certainty equivalent (labeled CE2) was then used in a fifty-fifty prospect to­
gether with TO0 to obtain a certainty equivalent labeled CE1, and together with TO4 to obtain a 
certainty equivalent labeled CE3. The third and final part of each session consisted of an inward 
TO procedure (see Figure 3) that used the most extreme preference switching value generated in 
the first part (i.e. TO4) as the starting point for a trial of four questions. Note that if  a subject 
maximizes expected utility (EU), then all three methods yield the same preference switching 
values (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996).
During the instruction the subject was told to imagine that each question involved a one­
time gambling situation involving real money that he or she was allowed to play only once. To 
help subjects imagine the hypothetical situation, one of the introductory questions was 
illustrated using a casino-like setting with real banknotes and dice. Also, the experimenter was 
present during all instructions to answer any questions.
A bounding, choice-only method was used to elicit the preference switching values during 
the instruction of all three parts: the computer generated a series of choices narrowing an inter­
val containing the preference switching value. During the experiment, subjects were encour­
aged to use the choice-only method, but they were allowed to state their preference switching 
value at any time by typing a value. Subjects were allowed to type a value because the use of a 
bounding method (that we do consider superior to the matching task) in a task that is very fa­
miliar is time consuming and may easily tire the subject. For example, when the computer pro­
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gram has not yet converged, a subject may already have a preference switching value in mind. 
If that is the case, further choices will not change the mind of the subject, but will take up valu­
able attention span. Values that violated stochastic dominance were not accepted. In that case 
the computer program indicated that the value given was not 'logical' and continued by again 
presenting the question. This procedure was mainly adopted to prevent typing errors.
4. Results
The order in which the gain and loss sessions were held did not have a significant effect in any 
of the comparisons; therefore the data of the two conditions are pooled.
Money (Hfl)
-  -1
-  - 2
-  - 3
-  - 4
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U til
Figure 5. Median values of the tradeoffs and certainty equivalents for losses, converted to utility functions.
The main hypothesis of the experiment concerns the shape of the value function for 
losses. First, we used a nonparametric test. As explained before, the chained TO method yields 
a series of monetary intervals that yield the same difference on the utility scale. A linear utility 
implies that all intervals are equal. A convex utility implies that when the amounts to be lost get 
larger, the intervals need to be larger to create an equal utility difference (this can easily be 
inferred from Figure 5). Therefore, if  an interval exceeds the previous interval at some indif­
ference point (i.e. TO1, TO2, or TO3), this reveals a convex part of the utility. More precise, a 
part surrounding TOi is called convex if TOi < 2 (TOi- 1 + TOi+1). A part surrounding TOi is
called concave if the opposite inequality holds, and is called linear when both sides are equal. 
For the CE method the classification is made likewise. Table 1 shows the percentage of 
convex, concave and linear parts for all subjects.
0
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Table 1. Percentage of convex, concave and linear parts for losses and gains.
Losses Gains
Outward Inward CE Outward Inward CE
Convex 47% 65% 66% 14% 10% 20%
Concave 34% 10% 17% 79% 85% 73%
Linear 19% 25% 17% 7% 5% 7%
For all methods, subjects provided three parts that can be classified as concave, convex or 
linear. Subjects with two or three concave parts were classified as revealing a concave utility. 
Subjects were similarly classified as revealing a convex or linear utility. If a subject revealed 
one convex, one concave and one linear part, the subject was not classified. Table 2 shows that 
for losses, there were significantly more subjects classified convex than concave for the CE 
method and inward TO procedure (bin(56,.5) p<.001, bin(42,.5) p<.001, respectively). For 
the outward TO procedure there were also significantly more subjects classified as convex than 
concave, but the proportion was less pronounced (bin(52,.5), p=.0352). In these tests, the null 
hypothesis states that a concave classification is as least as likely as a convex classification. 
Tests are therefore one-tailed. Linear classifications are excluded from the analysis.
Table 2. Number of subjects classified as convex, concave or linear, using nonparametric classification. 
*Subjects who crossed zero were not analyzed.
Losses Gains
Outward Inward* CE Outward Inward* CE
Convex 33 41 52 7 3 9
Concave 19 1 4 55 51 51
Linear 2 2 3 1 0 0
Table 3. Medians and trimmed means (10%) for parameters a  and ß of the utilities for losses and gains.
*Subjects who crossed zero were not analyzed.
Losses (ß) Gains (a)
Outward Inward* CE Outward Inward* CE
Median .8 3 7 .338 .241 .389 .210 .364
10% trim .901 .375 .364 .448 .276 .436
We also tested the main hypothesis by using a parametric estimation of the utilities 
assuming a power function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992):
( )  = g x a i f x  0 
u x ©À(-x)ß if  x<0
(7)
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Table 3 reports median values for a  and ß. Because of the noisiness of individual choice data, 
the median estimates seem more appropriate in our situation than the mean values (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992).5 Table 4 shows the number of subjects that had estimates for a  and ß indi­
cating a convex, concave or linear function. A subject was classified as being concave, convex 
or linear for losses when ß>1, ß<1, and ß=1, respectively, and for gains when a < 1, a > 1, and 
a=1, respectively. The classifications based on nonparametrical considerations were very simi­
lar to the parametric classifications. For losses, only 2.8% of the classifications based on ß 
were different from the nonparametrical classifications while for gains this was 4.9%. The 
conclusions for the parametric classifications were therefore the same as for the nonparametric 
classifications. We conclude that most subjects exhibit a convex utility for losses. Abdellaoui 
(1998) also found predominantly convex utilities for losses using the TO method.
Table 4. Number of subjects classified as convex, concave or linear, using parametric classification. *Subjects 
who crossed zero were not analyzed.
Losses Gains
Outward Inward* CE Outward Inward* CE
Convex 39 45 58 5 1 11
Concave 23 3 3 58 54 52
Linear 2 2 3 1 0 0
The utility for gains was also elicited (Figure 6). For gains, both diminishing marginal 
utility and diminishing sensitivity imply that the utility is concave, which is also a well-known 
empirical finding. In the experiment, the vast majority of subjects were classified as showing a 
concave utility for gains, both according to nonparametrical (Table 2) and parametrical classifi­
cations (Table 4). For all methods, there were significantly more subjects classified as being 
concave than convex (binomial tests at a  =.001) In these tests, the null hypothesis is that a 
subject is at least as likely being classified convex as concave. Linear classifications were ex­
cluded from the analysis. The above finding not only shows that the TO method yields the an­
ticipated results; it also shows that the responses are not just 'noise' (which would produce a 
random pattern of convex and concave points).
The outward and inward TO procedures were used to investigate the robustness of the TO 
method. After the outward TO procedure was finished an inward TO procedure was applied, 
using the same prospects, but now fixing the value of the right prospect with the final value 
provided in the outward procedure (see Figure 7). Therefore, the exact same choice situation is 
created, and subjects should provide exactly the same indifference switching points if  they sat­
isfy procedure invariance (Tversky et al, 1990). However, the first interval provided in the 
inward procedure systematically exceeds the final interval provided in the outward procedure. 
This holds true for losses (47 larger intervals versus 10 smaller intervals, bin(.5,57) p<.001, 
two-tailed), as well as for gains (39 larger intervals versus 16 smaller intervals, bin(.5,55)
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p=.003, two-tailed). The experiment also shows that the inward TO procedure yields utilities 
that are more curved than the utilities measured by the outward TO procedure (cf. Figures 5 and 
6). A within subjects comparison of the estimated parameters confirms this observation. For 
losses, most subjects showed parameters that were more convex for the inward than for the
Money (Hfl)
Figure 6. Median values of the tradeoffs and certainty equivalents for gains, converted to utility functions.
outward procedure (38 versus 10 subjects, bin(.5, 48) p<.001, two-tailed). For gains, most 
subjects revealed parameters that were more concave for the inward than the outward procedure 
(38 versus 14 subjects, bin(.5, 52) p<.001, two-tailed).
$2000
y
?
(-$160)
Final question of the outward procedure, with First question of the inward procedure, which 
an indifference switching point of -$160. should yield -$110 under procedure invariance.
Figure 7.
Fortunately, both the outward and the inward procedures show mainly convex utilities for 
losses, settling our main question. Still the question should be raised why both procedures 
show results that differ systematically. Although the design of our experiment was not intended
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to test hypotheses concerning the cause of these differences,6 some explanatory hypotheses 
may be put forward. The most intriguing question seems to be why the first interval of the in­
ward procedure systematically exceeds the last interval of the outward procedure, for Figure 7 
illustrates that the choice question is identical and therefore these questions are virtually the 
same. A first hypothesis, inspired by diminishing sensitivity, is best explained by an example. 
In the outward question (left-hand side Figure 7), the focus of attention is —$110. If the sub­
jects considers —$160 as the proper indifference point, this can be framed as an increase of 
nearly 50% (besides being a difference of $50). If  on the other hand —$160 is the focus of at­
tention, and —$110 is considered as the proper indifference switching point, the difference can 
be framed as a reduction of 'only' 30%. Therefore, exactly the same difference may appear 
larger depending on the focus of attention, which is the major difference between the two TO 
procedures. Diminishing sensitivity is similar, for it says that the same difference of $10 be­
tween $100 and $110 is perceived as smaller as the difference between $10 and $20. Subjects 
seem not only sensitive to the objective difference between monetary values but also to the dif­
ference expressed as a ratio (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988), that may be perceived differently 
depending on the focus of attention.
The diminishing sensitivity hypothesis also predicts the finding that the utilities of the in­
ward TO procedure are more curved than the utilities elicited by the outward TO procedure. Be­
cause the procedure is chained and the first intervals are large in the inward TO procedure, the 
final questions use small fixed values. By the same logic, these small fixed values will lead to 
small intervals. Therefore, the inward TO procedure leads to additional curvature of utility both 
for losses and gains. This pattern was indeed found for both losses and gains, as can be seen 
from a comparison of the length of the revealed intervals in Table 5.
Table 5. Median length of the intervals for the outward and inward TO procedures.
T 1O — T O o T O K> — T 1O 2O2T—
O
T
o
T—
o
T
Outward -25 -30 -25 -45
Losses Inward -20 -21.5 -38.5 -51
Outward 900 1820 4830 6000
Gains
Inward 425 925 3250 9000
Other explanations can be put forward, for example, it can be hypothesized that the first 
interval of the inward procedure exceeds the final interval of the outward procedure because 
subjects use an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Because 
the TO procedures are chained, the length of the previous interval may be used as an anchor. If 
this heuristic affects subjects responses and the interval is adjusted insufficiently as happens in 
the typical case, the final interval in the outward procedure is biased downwards (assuming 
convex and concave utilities for losses and gains respectively). In the inward procedure, the 
same question is asked but now the anchor that was used in the outward procedure is lost (after
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the outward procedure subjects first have to complete the entire CE method). This second 
hypothesis explains the discrepancy between final outward and first inward interval but it does 
not explain why the inward procedure yields utilities that are more curved. Anchoring and ad­
justment implies that intervals in the inward procedure will be relatively large because the initial 
anchor is large. As can be seen from Table 5, the inward procedure produces intervals that 
imply a much more curved utility, which does not agree well with the anchoring and adjustment 
hypothesis. This could be due to the effect of diminishing sensitivity that was hypothesized 
above. As subjects get near zero, differences that are small in an absolute sense become large in 
a relative (or ratio) sense.
Presently, we do not offer a conclusive analysis to the cause of the differences between 
both TO procedures. The hypotheses that were offered are not mutually exclusive: they may 
enhance each other. Both suggest that neither procedure is unbiased, but that the proper TO 
utility is somewhere in between both. A future study designed to investigate and test properties 
of the TO procedures seems warranted.
To investigate the properties of the TO method further, we compared the TO utilities to the 
utilities measured by the CE method. If a subject maximizes EU, the preference switching val­
ues of the CE method will be the same as the preference switching values of the TO procedure. 
The certainty effect hypothesis predicts that, as a result of the certainty effect, CE utilities will 
be more risk seeking for losses and more risk averse for gains.
Table 6. Comparison of extent of deviation from linearity between the CE method and TO procedures. Reported 
probabilities are two-tailed binomial tests. Null hypothesis states that it is equally likely that CE2<TO2 as 
CE2>TO2. Cases where CE2=TO2 were left out of the analysis.
Losses Gains
Outward TO Inward TO Outward TO Inward TO
CE2 < TO2 16 37 32 18
CE2 > TO2 39 23 31 42
p .003 .091 1 .003
First we compare the outward TO procedure to the CE method. For losses, the CE utilities 
were indeed more risk seeking than the outward TO utilities in agreement with the certainty ef­
fect hypothesis. This can be inferred from Table 6, where CE2 (the certainty equivalent of the 
first question of the CE method) is compared to TO2, the corresponding preference switching 
value of the TO procedure. We did not test the other two values obtained by the CE method 
statistically, because the answer of the first CE question usually does not equal the value of the 
comparable values of the TO-procedures which prevents a direct comparison of CE1 with TO1 
and CE3 with TO3. Figure 5 shows that a comparison of the median CE and TO values con­
firms the certainty effect hypothesis. For gains, Figure 6 suggests a tendency in agreement with
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the certainty effect hypothesis. However, no statistically significant result was obtained (Table
6). The latter agrees with the data of Wakker and Deneffe (1996).
For the inward TO procedure, the results are not as predicted by the certainty effect 
hypothesis. For losses no differences were found between inward TO and CE utilities. For 
gains, inward TO utilities deviated even more from linearity than CE utilities (Table 6). The 
comparison between the inward and outward procedure do suggest that the utilities of the 
inward procedure are biased away from linearity.
Other biases will also affect the results of our measurements. For the CE method, the sub­
ject may anchor on the midpoint of the gamble outcomes and adjust to an insufficient degree, 
thus biasing the utility towards linearity. This bias reduces the effects of the certainty effect hy­
pothesis. It is in line with Smidts' (1997) finding that CE utilities exhibited less concavity than 
riskless value functions for gains. Also, the TO procedures may be biased towards deviation 
from linearity, such as hypothesized in case of the inward procedure. Future study of such bi­
ases is warranted.
For losses, the parameter value ß for the outward TO procedure agrees with the value 
found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Abdellaoui (1998). The parameter values for the 
CE and inward TO procedure for losses are more extreme than commonly found which may be 
due to the biases described above. For gains, the parameter values for a  of all results are small 
which may be due to the domain of gain outcomes, that is large for the students participating in 
our study. Similar parameter values were found by Camerer and Ho (1994), Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996), and Gonzalez and Wu (1999).
5. Discussion
The main research question of this chapter concerns the shape of utility for losses: is it concave 
as predicted by diminishing marginal utility or convex as predicted by diminishing sensitivity? 
In our measurement, that is not affected by probability distortion, most subjects reveal a convex 
utility. This can only be explained by responsiveness to diminishing sensitivity. It does not 
necessarily mean that subjects are insensitive to marginal decreasing utility of money for losses, 
it only means that its effect is outweighed by the effect of diminishing sensitivity.
In order to defend the hypothesis that subjects are also responsive to diminishing marginal 
utility for losses, two interesting predictions can be tested. First, it may be argued that dimin­
ishing sensitivity concerning numbers will be the same for gains and losses. Diminishing sen­
sitivity concerns the perception of numbers, and, except for sign, numbers are the same for 
gains and losses. It might well prove that a hypothesis with a separate function for both phe­
nomena renders a good description of the data, while the diminishing sensitivity function is re­
stricted by having the same parameter value for both gains and losses. Second, it can be argued 
that when losses approximate bankruptcy, the effects of diminishing marginal utility outweigh 
the effects of diminishing sensitivity. It is therefore predicted that utility will be mostly convex 
for losses (especially near the reference point), but will yield a concave part for losses near
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ruin. This was hypothesized by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Libby and Fishburn (1977) 
and Laughhunn, Payne and Crum (1980) showed indeed a significant shift from risk seeking 
toward risk avoiding behavior when ruinous losses were introduced.
Our experiment also investigates properties of the TO method. The most striking result is 
that the utilities of the outward and inward TO procedures differ remarkably in the extent of 
deviation from linearity, considering that the both procedures are basically the same. We sug­
gested some hypotheses to explain this discrepancy but further study is warranted. Unfortu­
nately, violations of procedure invariance are ubiquitous to utility measurement (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 1971; Hershey, Kunreuther & Schoemaker, 1982; Delquip 1993; Camerer, 1995; 
Baron, 1997). Since systematic preference reversals were discovered it has become accepted 
(albeit reluctantly) that utility depends on the assessment method that is used (cf. Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1983). This phenomenon paved the way to a constructive view of utility assess­
ment: different assessment methods facilitate the use of different response strategies, leading to 
different utilities (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1980).
Our finding of convex utilities for losses shows that utility measurement is primarily re­
sponsive to diminishing sensitivity. This also reinforces the view that utilities are the result of a 
constructive process: diminishing sensitivity has nothing to do with our evaluation of money 
but is purely a matter of perception of numbers. To interpret the functions that result from re­
sponses that are predominantly determined by diminishing sensitivity as utility functions goes a 
long way from the interpretation that Cramer, Bernoulli, and Bentham had in mind. It shows 
once again that in predicting and aiding individual decision behavior, it is important to know the 
precise presentation of the decision problem, and the psychological mechanisms that govern its 
perception.
A cknow ledgm ent
Peter Wakker improved the present chapter with comments and discussions. Mathieu Koppen 
gave many helpful comments. Mark Rijpkema conducted part of the experiment.
N otes
1 It is controversial whether marginal utility used in risky decisions is equivalent to marginal utility used in 
riskless situations. Our discussion is therefore restricted to marginal utility for decision under risk. For a discus­
sion on this issue see Dyer & Sarin (1982), Wakker (1994), and Smidts (1997). For some results showing con­
cave utilities for gains see Parker and Schneider (1988). For a review of experiments on utility in riskless situa­
tions see Galanter (1980).
2 Note that also a 'breaking-even' effect may exist, further enhancing risk seeking.
3 The certainty effect has been studied mostly for gains, where it enhances the attractiveness of the sure gain and 
thus enhances risk aversion.
4 A computer program was employed that can be obtained from the second author upon request.
5 The distribution for a and ß is skewed to the right because estimates cannot be lower than 0. Therefore, out­
liers will cause means to be too extreme.
6 Because the outward method preceded the inward method, the effect might be due to an order effect. However, 
the TO methods were separated by the CE method (including a lengthy introduction). Also, there was no order
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effect for the gain and loss conditions, indicating that previous experience with the TO method did not affect re­
sults.
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Abstract
An event is said to be 'spread' when it is divided into several other events that yield similar out­
comes as the original event. Experiments are reported showing that event-spreading can be 
used to generate violations of dominance, transitivity, the comonotonic sure-thing principle and 
presentation and procedural invariance. This chapter estimates the size of these effects and 
evaluates explanations and proposals to model these effects. Event-spreading effects are pre­
dictable under special conditions but minor manipulations may lessen these effects signifi­
cantly. Although event-spreading effects may not be robust enough to justify adjustments of 
decision models, detailed knowledge of these effects remains important to understand specific 
violations of expected utility theory and to guard against confounding effects in choice experi­
ments.
Key words: dominance, event-splitting, transitivity, comonotonic sure-thing principle, pres­
entation invariance, procedural invariance, subadditivity
Fennema, Hein. (1999). "Effects of Event-Spreading: When Less is More," submitted.
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Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) put expected utility theory on an axiomatic foun­
dation, it has been a popular strategy to show that an axiom is systematically violated. Besides 
characterizing expected utility precisely, the normatively appealing axioms also provide a 
yardstick for evaluating decisions. Systematic violations of these axioms therefore lead to 
significant insights into the psychology of decision making. The earliest and most famous 
example of this strategy is the paradox of Allais (Allais, 1953), showing systematic deviations 
from the sure-thing principle (Savage, 1954) or independence axiom. Psychologically, the 
Allais paradox illustrates what is now known as the certainty effect: sure outcomes are much 
more attractive than outcomes that are merely probable. This strategy of testing axioms and 
normative principles has been a major guide line for research. Many important insights into 
human decision making have been gained (e.g. loss aversion, isolation effect, scale com­
patibility) and the development of interesting alternative theories to expected utility theory that 
model some of these effects has proved fruitful (Camerer 1995).
Recently, the axiom of stochastic dominance has been subject to this strategy. Gambles A, 
B have been constructed such that A dominates B but the majority of subjects prefer B to A. 
This is surprising, because dominance is normatively very compelling. Loosely speaking, 
dominance says that if gamble A yields at least as much as gamble B for all events, then gamble 
A will be preferred to gamble B. The next section provides a brief description of experiments 
showing violations of dominance and the explanations that have been offered so far. The hy­
pothesis put forward here is that these violations are caused by the "event-spreading" effect, 
which generalizes the event-splitting effect (Starmer and Sugden, 1993). The second section 
presents new experiments demonstrating that event-spreading can be used to induce violations 
of almost any normative principle: dominance, comonotonic sure-thing principle, transitivity 
and presentation and procedural invariance. However, it will be argued that the size of these 
effects is only moderate. Even more important, it will be demonstrated that event-spreading 
effects are not very robust, which makes modeling difficult. The final section provides an 
explanation and discussion of the event-spreading effect.
1 History
The first example of a pair of gambles where stochastic dominance is systematically violated 
was given by Tversky and Kahneman (1986). As can be seen easily, gamble B below domi­
nates gamble A, and, indeed, all subjects prefer B to A.
Gamble A [0%, N=88]
90% white 
$0
Gamble B [100%]
90% white 
$0
6% red 
win $45
6% red 
win $45
1% green 
win $30
1% green 
win $45
1% blue 
lose $15
1% blue 
lose $10
2% yellow 
lose $15
2% yellow 
lose $15
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Gamble A' below is a simplified version of gamble A, by replacing all blue marbles by yellow 
marbles. Gamble B' below is a simplified version of B by replacing all green marbles by red 
marbles. This change of presentation of the choice problem, by coalescing events with identical 
outcomes, seems innocent, but preferences change dramatically.
Gamble A' [58%, N=124]
90% white 6% red 1% green 3% yellow
$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15
Gamble B' [42%]
90% white 7% red 1% blue 2% yellow
$0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
Subjects were induced to carefully consider their choice between A' and B' because 10% of the 
participants actually received the gamble of their choice. Despite this incentive, 58% now 
preferred the dominated gamble A'. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) called this phenomenon 
Nontransparent Dominance, to show that if  gambles are presented transparently as A versus B, 
subjects recognize dominance and choose accordingly. If the same gambles are presented as A' 
versus B', dominance is not transparent and preferences may change. To explain these 
violations, they suggest that the nontransparent case of dominance is violated because by 
'masking' dominance, the dominated gamble A' features two gains and one loss which 
’enhances the attractiveness'relative to the dominating gamble B', that features one gain and 
two losses.
In the example above, coalescing events causes subjects to choose a dominated alternative. 
The reverse operation, splitting events, also reveals effects that are contrary to normative prin­
ciples as was demonstrated by Starmer and Sugden (1993). Several previous experiments pro­
duced significant proportions of intransitive choices that were first described as juxtaposition 
effects confirming regret theory (Starmer & Sugden, 1989b; Starmer, 1992). In a clever
Gamble C [84%, N=90] 
Gamble D [16%]
Gamble C' [56%, N=90] 
Gamble D' [44%]
1 55 56 100
0.00 11.00
7.00 0.00
55 45
1 45 46 90 91 100
0.00 11.00 0.00
7.00 0.00 7.00
45 45 10
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experimental design, Starmer and Sugden (1993) show that the major cause of the intransi­
tivities found was not juxtaposition but the splitting of events, further confirmed by Humphrey 
(1995). Comparing the choices between gambles C and D and gambles C' and D', it is evident 
that both choice situations are identical, except for the splitting of the event yielding £7. Note 
that the juxtaposition of events is the same in both problems, i.e. in both problems every gain is 
juxtaposed by an outcome of £0 in the other gamble. Starmer and Sugden introduced the event­
splitting effect to explain the significant difference in proportions of subjects choosing C(84%) 
and C' (56%). Similar effects for choice under ambiguity were reported by Fennema and 
Wakker (1996).
Birnbaum and Navarette (1998) report surprisingly large proportions of violations of 
dominance, illustrated by gambles E and F.
Gamble E [73%, N=100]
0.10 0.05 0.85
$12 $90 $96
Gamble F [27%]
0.05 0.05 0.90
$12 $14 $96
Although this choice can be formulated as a case of Nontransparent Dominance (by coalescing 
events with identical outcomes in gambles E' and F' below), Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) 
focus on the structure of E' and F' that induces the violations of dominance. The advantage of 
this approach, which they call 'a recipe for violations', is that it connects more closely with 
why dominance is violated.
Gamble E' [14%, N=64, Birnbaum (1998)]
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.85
$12 $12 $90 $96
Gamble F' [86%]
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.85
$12 $14 $96 $96
Consider the construction (Figure 1) of the choice problem between gambles E and F from 
the 'parent' gamble (0.10, $12 ; 0.90, $96) depicted in the middle. First, gamble E is construc­
ted (left hand set of arrows) by splitting the event of 0.90 probability to win $96 of the parent 
into two events that feature similar outcomes as the original ($90 and $96), where similarity is 
taken in relation to the remaining outcome ($12). When these conditions apply an event is said 
to be spread. Because the event that is spread yields a favorable outcome ($96) the event- 
spreading effect hypothesizes that the attractiveness of E is increased compared to the parent 
gamble. Likewise, the attractiveness of gamble F is decreased compared to the parent gamble
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0.10 probability to win $12 0.05 probability to win $12
0.10 probability to win $12
0.05 probability to win $90 ¡ ^ 0.05 probability to win $14
0.90 probability to win $96
0.85 probability to win $96 ------------------------------------ • 0.90 probability to win $96
Gamble E Latent parent gamble Gamble F
Figure 1. Construction of the dominated gamble E and dominant gamble F from the (latent) parent gamble.
because here the unfavorable event of winning $12 is spread (right hand set of arrows) into two 
events yielding similar unfavorable outcomes ($12 and $14). Because the attractiveness of the 
dominant gamble F is decreased while the attractiveness of the dominated gamble E is 
increased, the event-spreading effect can explain violations of dominance in this instance. 
Furthermore, it may now be hypothesized that when events are spread repeatedly, the 
attractiveness of the gamble is further enhanced or decreased. This will be called the generalized 
spreading hypothesis.
Event-splitting (Starmer and Sugden, 1993; Humphrey, 1995, 1996) is a special case of 
event-spreading, which applies when an event is replaced by events featuring identical out­
comes to the original. Because preferences are also affected when outcomes are not identical 
but merely similar, the somewhat imprecise definition of event-spreading is justified.
Several suggestions how to model event-spreading effects have been proposed. Any the­
ory that aims at modeling event-spreading necessarily abandons the coalescing property (Luce, 
1997) that entails that a gamble (x,p!;x,p2) is identical to the gamble (x,p!+p2). A candidate is 
prospective reference theory (Viscusi, 1989). The model that is proposed most often is 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) without the combination operation of the 
editing phase (Kahneman and Tversky, 1986; Starmer and Sugden, 1993; Wu, 1994; 
Humphrey, 1996), where the preferences violating dominance are consistent with subadditivity 
of decision weights. This proposal, however, only applies to original prospect theory which is 
limited to gambles with at most two non-zero outcomes. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and other rank-dependent theories cannot account for these 
effects because splitting or spreading of events does not change the sum of the decision 
weights, only their allocation.
Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) proposed a model that weights outcomes in a subadditive 
manner where outcomes of all distinct probability-outcome pairs in a gamble are compared to 
each other. The TAX model predicts the maximization of a value that is assigned to each 
gamble G=(p1,x1;...;pn,xn) with 0< x 1<...<xn by
i n n i-1
TAX(G) = —--------{ ¿ S(P j )u(Xj) + ¿  X[u(x i ) - u ( xj )] v frj.G )}  (1)
X S( Pi) i=1 j= 2 j =1
i=1
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Because this model is very general (due to the gamble G appearing in the function œ), in this 
chapter it is assumed that the TAX model implies that (û(i,j,G) = S(pi) 8 /  (n+1) and the pa­
rameters u(x)=x, S(p)=p07, and 8=-1 as was proposed by Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998). 
The next section provides several experiments that demonstrate violations of normative prin­
ciples through event-spreading. These experiments also test predictions of the TAX model and 
allow insight into the size and robustness of event-spreading effects.
2. Experiment
The experiment consisted of several parts, each illustrating a violation of a normative principle 
induced by event-spreading effects. Each part is presented successively and includes the design 
and experimental results.
Participants in the main study, conducted at the University of Nijmegen, were 98 volun­
teers, most of whom were undergraduate psychology students. For answering 66 questions 
contained in a booklet subjects were rewarded Ÿ7,- (about $3.50), which did not depend on the 
answers. There was no real incentive connected to the choices but comparative studies show 
that hypothetical and real choices yield very similar responses (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). 
This finding is further confirmed in this case by the results of Birnbaum (1998) that uses real 
incentives but reports nearly identical results as Birnbaum and Navarette (1998) that use 
hypothetical problems. The task was self-paced and took about 30 minutes on average. The 
items were presented using four different displays as a between subjects factor. There were two 
versions of each booklet in which the order of the questions was reversed. Each booklet started 
with an introduction to the experimental task explaining choices and the matching task; the 
introduction only differed with respect to the display of the items.
Violations of Dominance. First, tests were replicated where the event-spreading effect 
was used to induce violations of dominance. For example, consider the choice between 
gambles G-  and G+ below. The indexes indicate that both gambles are derived from gamble 
G=(.35, Ÿ0 ; .65, Ì65). G -  is dominated by G but is predicted to be more attractive according 
to the event-spreading effect because the event yielding a large outcome is spread. G+ 
dominates G but it is less attractive because the event yielding a small outcome is spread. 
Event-spreading therefore enhances a choice of G- , violating dominance.
G-  [48%] .35 probability to win Ÿ0 G + .30 probability to win Ÿ0
.10 probability to win Ÿ60 .05 probability to win Ÿ5
.55 probability to win Ì65 .65 probability to win Ì65
In our experiment, the choice between gambles G-  and G+ shows the largest rate of violations 
of dominance. Averaged across the four different displays, 48% of the subjects violated 
dominance. Other items with the same structure (5 in total), including gambles E versus F (see
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above, 43% violations) show an average of 41% violations of dominance. Two choices in­
volved gambles with outcomes divisible by 5 (e.g. gambles G-  and G+) and three choices in­
volved gambles with no such outcomes (e.g. E and F) but this variation did not lead to sig­
nificantly different proportions of violations of dominance (on average 43% vs. 39% resp.).
H-  [ 18%] .15 probability to win 120 H .10 probability to win 120
.10 probability to win Ÿ00 .05 probability to win 125
.75 probability to win Ÿ10 .10 probability to win 1100
.75 probability to win 1110
Although modal choice does not violate dominance in our experiment, the average rate of 
violations is quite large. Moreover, it seems evident that the violations of dominance are in­
duced by event-spreading. Consider for example gambles H-  and H. Here, the effect of event- 
spreading is reduced compared to the case of G-  versus G+. Only the event in H-  of .15 
probability to win 120 is spread into two events yielding small outcomes in H. The average rate 
of violations of dominance in these cases decreased to 19%. Cases where only a large outcome 
was spread or not (i.e. a structure of X compared to X+) showed a comparable rate of 
violations of 14%. If the events are not spread at all and therefore the dominance structure is 
entirely transparent, the average rate of violations drops to 4%.
An interesting difference between our results and previous experiments carried out by 
Birnbaum and colleagues (Birnbaum and Navarette, 1998; Birnbaum, Patton and Lott, 1999; 
Birnbaum, 1998) is the proportion of violations of dominance. The average rate of violations of 
dominance between E and F in our study is 41% whereas this rate is about 70% in Birnbaum's 
data. Because many questions in our experiment involved a dominance structure, a possible 
explanation is that there has been a learning effect. To test this hypothesis the results of the two 
(reversed) orders were compared. Figure 2 shows that there has been a small but significant 
learning effect where the rate of violations of dominance decreases during the experiment. A 
logistical regression analysis, performed through EGRET with subjects treated as a random 
variable, revealed that the proportion of violations of dominance can be significantly predicted 
on the basis of the rank of the item in the booklet (p=0.016, one-sided). However, even when 
learning is taken into account, the rate of violations is still well below the rates that are reported 
in the experiments mentioned above. For example, the first item that subjects encountered, 
which also resembles the items used by Birnbaum and colleagues (i.e. item 7 of series 2 in 
Figure 2) shows an average rate of violations of 51%. In accordance with the generalized 
spreading hypothesis it can be presumed that to find choice problems that yield a modal 
violation of dominance, the attractiveness of the dominated gamble needs to be further en­
hanced or the attractiveness of the dominating gamble needs to be further diminished. In order
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Figure 2. Average proportion of violations of dominance in the order of series A and reverse order of series B, 
e.g. item 1 is the item first encountered by subjects presented with series A and the last item encountered by 
subjects presented with series B.
to test this hypothesis, a test was constructed based on gamble I=(.7, Ÿ6;.3, 187). This gam­
ble was improved (I+) by taking .1 probability from the worst outcome to a slightly better out­
come, i.e. .1 probability of gaining 121, instead of 116. As was the case above, I + dominates I 
but according to the event-spreading hypothesis the attractiveness of I+ is diminished because 
of the two small outcomes. This procedure was repeated, creating I++ by shifting another .1 
probability from Ÿ 6 to 127. I ++ dominates I+ and I, but now features three small outcomes, 
and according to the generalized spreading hypothesis the gamble is less attractive than I+. An 
analogous procedure provides I-  and I .
I [28%] .70 probability to win Ÿ6 I ++ .50 probability to win 116
.10 probability to win Ÿ 8 .10 probability to win 121
.10 probability to win 181 .10 probability to win 127
.10 probability to win 187 .30 probability to win 187
The prediction of the generalized spreading hypothesis (and the TAX model) is that in a choice 
between I and I++, the rate of violations will exceed the rate of violations of the choice 
between I-  and I+. This was not found. On the contrary, the rate of violations of 28% in I 
versus I++ is significantly lower than the 43% in I-  versus I+ (Cochran's Q=6.8, df=1, 
p=0.01, two-sided). One other choice in the experiment has the same structure (X vs. X++) 
and shows a similar small rate of violations (27%). The conclusion seems to be that the gen­
eralized spreading hypothesis is too general to describe this choice behavior adequately.
Violations of Presentation Invariance. For most theories of choice (EU, RDU, CPT) a 
gamble is defined as a probability distribution function on the outcome space. Splitting or 
coalescing events does not change the gamble (for it still has the same distribution), only its
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presentation. Therefore, these theories cannot explain event-splitting effects, and they predict 
no special effect of event-spreading. For these theories, event-spreading effects pose a violation 
of presentation invariance, whereas for other theories, such as the TAX model, these effects 
can be modeled.
In addition to splitting, coalescing or spreading of events there are many other ways a pair 
of gambles can be presented that also affect preferences. Event-spreading may obscure the 
dominance structure when probabilities and outcomes are presented in words as was done in 
the presentations of gambles used so far. The dominance structure may be less obscured in 
alternative presentations, decreasing the impact of event-spreading on the attractiveness of 
gambles. A hypothesis that is therefore particularly relevant to our investigation is whether
the display of a gamble affects the proportion of violations of dominance. If this turns out to be 
the case then all present models of choice face violations of presentation invariance.
To test this hypothesis a 2 ~  2 design was employed that varied the display of the gambles 
(see Figure 3). Both amounts and probabilities were either displayed 'transparently' or 'non-
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transparently'. In the transparent versions, separate events were represented by rectangles. In 
this way, subjects could compare gambles also visually. Probabilities were displayed trans­
parently by maintaining the width of the rectangle proportional to the probability of the events. 
The outcomes were displayed transparently by maintaining the height of the rectangles propor­
tional to the amount to be won. Note that if  both outcomes and probabilities are displayed 
transparently, the total area of the rectangles represents the expected value of the gamble. For 
further reference, the presentations will be denoted 'word' (nontransparent probabilities and 
outcomes), 'strip' (transparent probabilities), 'bar' (transparent outcomes), and 'area' 
(transparent probabilities and outcomes).
It was expected that transparency would help subjects to detect the dominance structure. 
Especially the transparency of probabilities can be of help to detect dominance despite event- 
spreading (cf. Figure 3). Starmer and Sugden (1993) used a display very similar to the strip 
display used here and still detected significant event-splitting effects; it was therefore not ex­
pected that transparency of probability would cause violations of dominance to disappear 
completely.
Display does have an effect on preference (Table 1), the difference between the violation 
rates of dominance are significant between the strip and area display (p=0.037, Tukey's HSD). 
The hypothesis that violations of dominance will be reduced when probabilities can be more 
easily (i.e. visually) compared was not confirmed. Comparisons between the violation rates of 
the four display conditions were as expected except for the strip condition that showed an even 
larger rate of violations than the word condition. Currently no plausible explanation for this 
result can be offered. Future research may shed some light on this issue. The main conclusion 
remains, however, that display can significantly alter violation rates of dominance.
Table 1. Average violation rates of dominance in X-  versus X+ gambles.
Probabilities 
Nontransparent Transparent Total
Outcomes
Nontransparent .43 (word) .55 (strip) .49
Transparent .36 (bar) .29 (area) .33
Total .39 .42 .41
A supplementary question that needs clarification is whether the various displays differ 
with respect to naturalness according to the subjects and whether subjects prefer to choose 
being presented with one display rather than another. Subjects were presented with all possible 
pairwise comparisons between displays (6 questions) and chose which display was the more 
natural and which display they would prefer as a format for their decisions. As was expected, 
naturalness and preference for display coincided for most subjects. The results were also very 
assuring in the sense that 85% of the subjects provided a transitive order across displays
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whereas random responses would yield only 3 transitive orders out of 8. Because these ques­
tions were posed after the main experiment, every subject was very familiar with one display 
which was then judged to be the most natural by most subjects. The results indicate that, 
corrected for this effect,1 the word display was least popular: only 13% indicated they would 
like to choose being presented with this display. The other displays were all about equally 
popular, and about twice as popular as the word display. So it seems that most subjects like a 
visual component in the display, but they do not agree on what component this should be.
Violations of Procedural invariance. So far, all conclusions are drawn based on direct 
choices between gambles. The booklet, however, also contained questions that elicited pref­
erence by asking subjects to equate the gamble with an amount of money, henceforth called the 
certaintyequivalent. The instruction carefully explained that for each gamble there must be an 
amount of money smaller than the maximum and larger than the minimum pay-off that should 
be valued the same as the gamble. That is, presented with a choice between this amount for 
certain on the one hand and the gamble on the other the subject would express indifference. By 
comparing certainty equivalents provided by the subject, a preference between gambles is 
elicited that coincides with the preference obtained through direct choice if procedural 
invariance holds.2
Table 2. Some results of the design based on Gamble I.
I- - I- I I+ I++
Gamble .7 , f  16 
.1 , f  78 
.1 , f  82 
.1 , f  87
.7 , f  16 
.1 , f  82 
.2 , f  87
.7 , f  16 
.3 , f  87
.6 , f  16 
.1 , f  21 
.3 , f  87
.5 , f  16 
.1 , f  21 
.1 , f  27 
.3 , f  87
TAX Value 34.9 33.8 31.5 28.0 26.9
Mean Certainty Equivalent 41.7 41.2 39.0 38.2 37.3
The test of procedural invariance was carried out with the gambles based on gamble I (see 
Table 2). In contrast to modal preferences elicited with direct choice, mean certainty equivalents 
show the pattern predicted by the generalized spreading hypothesis (Table 2). The average 
certainty equivalents differ significantly (F(4,92)=2.9, p=0.027). Transparency of probability, 
transparency of outcomes, as well as their interaction were not significant; therefore only 
overall means are presented. The generalized spreading hypothesis predicts that the 
attractiveness of I through I++ decreases, which was confirmed by the data (first order 
polynomial contrast, F(1,4)=4.4, p<0.01).
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Table 3. Proportion of certainty equivalents where CE(Row) > CE (Column). Ties are disregarded.
Gambles I- - I- I ++I+I
I- - *
0.43 *
I 0.43 0.41 *
I+ 0.33 0.39 0.42 *
I++ 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.48 *
A test more appropriate than comparing average certainty equivalents may be provided by 
comparing the certainty equivalents within subjects. Table 3 reports the proportion of certainty 
equivalents of dominant gambles larger than certainty equivalents of dominated gambles. The 
within subjects analysis therefore also reveals that modal preferences elicited through certainty 
equivalents violate dominance as can be explained by the event-spreading effect.
Table 4 provides preferences elicited with direct choice. Comparing Table 3 with Table 4 it 
can be concluded that modal preferences elicited with direct choice satisfy dominance whereas 
modal preferences elicited through comparing certainty equivalents violate dominance. This can 
be viewed as a new kind of preference reversal, where subjects choose the dominant gamble 
but are willing to pay more for the dominated gamble.
Table 4. Proportions of choices where the gamble in the row is preferred to the gamble in the column. Cells de­
noted with '-' indicate that the corresponding choice was not part of the design.
Gambles I- -  I-  I I+ I++
I- - *
- *
I 0.86 0.84 *
I+ - 0.57 0.92 *
I++ 0.72 - 0.95 - *
The difference between preferences elicited through choice and certainty equivalents also di­
vides the predictions of the various models. Whereas the TAX model predicts modal preference 
elicited through certainty equivalents, CPT predicts modal choice.
Violations of Transitivity. It may be presumed that when dominance is violated, 
transitivity must also be violated, but this is not a logical consequence (Luce, 1998). For 
example, the TAX model allows violations of dominance, but not of transitivity. In the design, 
triplets of gambles were used that test transitivity. Consider the following three choices from 
the design of gamble I.
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I+ .60 probability to win Ÿ6 I - .70 probability to win 116
.10 probability to win 121 .10 probability to win 182
.30 probability to win 187 .20 probability to win 187
I+ .60 probability to win 116 I .70 probability to win 116
.10 probability to win 121 .30 probability to win 187
.30 probability to win 187
I .70 probability to win 116 I - .70 probability to win 116
.30 probability to win 187 .10 probability to win 182
.20 probability to win 187
Prior to the experiment it was expected that the event-spreading effect would cause many sub­
jects to violate dominance in the first choice, as was suggested by previous experiments. It was 
also expected that the other two choices would show a much lower rate of violations of 
dominance because the event-spreading effect is reduced which renders dominance more 
transparent. However, if  subjects violate dominance in the first but not in the other choices, 
they violate transitivity: I-  f  I+, I+ f  I, but I f  I- .
Table 5. Total response patterns for five different triplets of choices testing transitivity.
Pattern Total %
Pattern violates
dominance transitivity
X+ f  X f  X- 273 56
X+ f  X-  f  X 21 4 ✓
X f  X+ f  X- 14 3 ✓
X-  f  X+ f  X 41 8 ✓
X-  f  X f  X+ 13 3 ✓
X f  X-  f  X+ 14 3 ✓
X-  f  X f  X+ f  X- 8 2 ✓ ✓
X+ f  X f  X-  f  X+ 106 22 ✓ ✓
Violations of dominance are not prevalent in our study and the pattern most observed is 
therefore transitive with no violations of dominance (56%). The pattern that is second most 
prevalent is the predicted intransitive pattern (22%). Table 5 shows all possible response pat­
terns for five different triplets of choices where transitivity can be tested. If dominance is vio­
lated in either of the three choices, 49% of the subjects violate transitivity in the predicted di­
rection whereas based on randomness this would only be 14%. Also, it seems indicative that 
the predicted intransitive cycle is 13 times more common than the opposite intransitive cycle.
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As can be seen from Table 5, the pattern predicted by the TAX model (X-  f  X f  X+) is rare 
(3%)4, whereas the pattern predicted by EU and RDU models is quite common (56%).
Violations of the Comonotonic Sure Thing Principle. The central axiom of EU is 
the independence axiom or sure thing principle (Fishburn & Wakker, 1995). It asserts that if 
two alternatives share a common outcome (i.e., there is an event for which both alternatives 
yield the same outcome) then this outcome is irrelevant to the preference between these alterna­
tives. Therefore, if  the value of a common outcome is changed, preference should not reverse. 
Various paradoxes show that the sure thing principle is systematically violated. To accom­
modate these violations various new models have been offered that relax this axiom. Rank- 
dependent theories (such as CPT) have been most influential so far. The central axiom of rank- 
dependent theories is a restricted version of the sure thing principle, the comonotonic sure thing 
principle (CSTP; Wakker, 1996). It asserts that if  the value of a common outcome is changed, 
but the change does not alter the order of the events, ranked by outcomes (i.e., the rank order 
of the gamble) of any of the alternatives, preferences may not change. If the rank order of one 
gamble is changed, CSTP does not apply and preferences may change according to rank- 
dependent theories but not according to EU.
Changes of a common outcome can be established that are comonotonic but nevertheless 
change the relative attractiveness of the gambles involved according to an effect reminiscent of 
event-spreading. For example, gambles J and K below share a common outcome, .20 prob­
ability to win 128. If this outcome is changed to 176, (changing the gambles from J to J' and K 
to K') the sure thing principle applies and preferences should not change. Because the change 
of common outcome does not change the rank order of any gamble, the comonotonic sure-thing 
principle applies and preference reversals cannot be modeled by RDU or CPT. Event-spreading 
effects may however induce changes of preference. In the first problem the gambles J and K 
both feature two small outcomes and one large outcome. After changing the common outcome 
gamble K' features two large and one small outcome, whereas the outcomes of J' are not 
changed (only their probability). Event-spreading therefore suggests that the attractiveness of 
K' is enhanced compared to J' and predicts preference reversals in this direction (i.e. choices 
for J and K').
J [58%] .25 probability to win 121 K .50 probability to win 114
.45 probability to win 128 .20 probability to win 128
.30 probability to win Ÿ6 .30 probability to win 197
J' [46%] .25 probability to win 121 K ' .50 probability to win 114
.25 probability to win 128 .20 probability to win Ÿ6
.50 probability to win Ÿ6 .30 probability to win 197
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To analyze these questions it must be noted that responses also depend on risk attitude. Risk 
averse subjects may prefer both J and J' whereas a risk seeking subject may prefer both K and 
K' despite event-spreading.5 It is therefore instructive to analyze these choices by comparing 
the rate of the two different kinds of changes of preference (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1993; 
Fennema & Wakker, 1996). The change of preference predicted by the generalized spreading 
hypothesis, J and K', is significantly more common than the change of preference K and J' 
(resp. 27% versus 14%, binomial test, p=.04, one sided).
Four choice problems testing CSTP were used. Two problems featured outcomes that 
were all multiples of 15 and two problems had no such outcomes (e.g. J and K). Again, this 
variation did not lead to significantly different results. A second variation concerned the way in 
which event-spreading was realized. Let + and -  denote large and small outcomes respectively. 
In all cases, event-spreading occurs in choices between a — + versus a -++  gamble. However, 
this can be compared to a choice between a — + versus a — + gamble (the structure of J' vs. 
K' and J vs. K), or to a choice between a -+ +  versus a -+ +  gamble. Both structures revealed 
similar numbers of changes of preference as suggested by event-spreading.
Previous tests of the CSTP are consistent with these results. When event-spreading effects 
are not present, violations of the CSTP are rare (Wakker, Erev & Weber, 1994; Fennema & 
Wakker, 1996). When event-spreading effects occur the CSTP is systematically violated (Wu 
1994; Fennema & Wakker, 1996). Wu (1994) tests ordinal independence (Green & Jullien, 
1989), a special case of the CSTP (Wakker, 1994). Some of the significant violations of the 
CSTP that are reported in Wu (1994) involve event-spreading, but preferences change in the 
opposite direction predicted by the event-spreading effect.
In the present experiment the changes of common outcomes induced about twice as many 
changes of preference predicted by event-spreading (23% on average) as changes of preference 
in the opposite direction (11% on average). The difference between these percentages is 
significant, and therefore it can be concluded that the CSTP is systematically violated. On the 
other hand, it also means that on average only 12% of the preferences shift in the direction 
predicted by the event-spreading effect, which is not very impressive.
Risk seeking behavior for mean preserving spreads. A robust finding in decision 
making under risk is that a majority of subjects display risk averse behavior with regard to 
gambles with moderate or large probabilities to win. This is mostly due to the certainty effect, 
but also comparing risky gambles to each other, subjects usually prefer the gamble that is the 
lesser risky. According to EU with a concave utility for money reflecting diminishing marginal 
utility, risk aversion is also the rational choice. That subjects are usually risk averse can also be 
inferred from gambles L and M. Gamble L is a mean preserving spread of M, where a .3 
probability to win 140 in M is spread into .2 probability to win 110 and a .1 probability to win 
1100. In this case (and similar other cases) the majority of subjects indeed displays risk averse 
behavior (on average 33%).6
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L [26%] .40 probability to win Ÿ0 M .20 probability to win Ÿ0
.30 probability to win 140 .60 probability to win 140
.30 probability to win Ÿ00 .20 probability to win Ÿ 00
However, mean preserving spreads can also be constructed where the risky option is enhanced 
in a fashion similar to the event-spreading effect. Consider gamble N, a mean preserving 
spread of O. In gamble N a .2 probability to win 176 is spread into a .05 probability to win 119 
and a .15 probability to win 195. The event-spreading effect suggests that the attractive­
N [79%] .65 probability to win Ÿ9 O .60 probability to win Ÿ9
.20 probability to win Ÿ6 .40 probability to win Ÿ6
.15 probability to win 195
ness of N is enhanced because N features two large outcomes and O only one. The majority of 
subjects indeed favor the risky gamble. The most surprising part is that the proportion of risk 
seeking choices is increased by about 50%. It must be noted that this risk seeking pattern can 
also be explained with rank-dependent models. For example, CPT suggests an inverse S- 
shaped weighting function which implies that the best outcomes are weighted more heavily than 
the middle outcomes. This will enhance the risk seeking option, which can be illustrated if 
decision weights are compared using the weighting function and parameter that was suggested 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). In the example of gambles N and O, a probability of .40 (to 
win 176) is split into probabilities of .15 (to win 195), .20 (to win Ÿ 6) and .05 (to win Ÿ9), 
rank-ordered according to outcomes. The decision weights then change from 0.37 to 
respectively 0.23, 0.12, and 0.02. The 195 outcome of M receives a relatively large weight and 
therefore the pattern M fL  and N fO  can well be explained by CPT.
P [43%] .50 probability to win 120 Q .40 probability to win 120
.20 probability to win 180 .45 probability to win 180
.15 probability to win Ÿ20 .15 probability to win Ÿ50
.15 probability to win Ÿ50
To neutralize the effects of overweighting of a small probability receiving the best outcome 
a new set of questions was tested where the event-spreading effect was used to enhance a risky 
gamble where the best outcome was always a common outcome with a probability of 0.15 as 
illustrated by gambles P and Q above. In such choice problems the average proportion of risk 
seeking was reduced to 36%, which is still somewhat larger than the average proportion of 
28% of risk seeking for choice problems where event-spreading effects are not present (e.g. L 
versus M). The most likely explanation therefore seems to be that both overweighting of
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extreme outcomes and event-spreading are responsible for the large proportions of risk seeking 
that were found in the choice between N and O and other similar choice problems.
3. Discussion
The experiments in this chapter and the previous ones by Tversky and Kahneman (1986), 
Starmer and Sugden (1993), and Birnbaum and Navarrete (1998) show that event-spreading 
can be used to induce violations of almost any normative principle of choice. Whereas it is clear 
that event-spreading does affect preferences, the question remains how this effect should be 
interpreted. This question involves considerations of effect-size, robustness and implications 
for modeling preference. Finally, the question of how to explain event-spreading effects will be 
considered.
3.1 Effect size
Whereas the conclusion of the existence of an effect can be settled by statistical tests, the more 
important question of effect-size is also more difficult to assess. Our experiment suggests that 
the size of the event-spreading effect is only moderate. That is, modal choice does not violate 
dominance, nor transitivity, nor the (comonotonic) sure thing principle. The basic axioms of 
expected utility are therefore satisfied. Modal choice is risk seeking for mean preserving 
spreads when their attractiveness is enhanced by event-spreading. This result does not agree 
with expected utility combined with diminishing marginal utility but can be explained partly by 
the well known phenomenon that a small probability that yields a large outcome may be 
overweighted. When the effects of overweighting are neutralized, modal choice becomes risk 
averse despite effects of event-spreading enhancing risk seeking behavior. If choice theories 
aim at describing modal choice behavior, our results suggest that event-spreading effects may 
be ignored.
The moderate size of the event-spreading effects in the present experiment can also be as­
certained from a comparison between the predictions of the TAX model and CPT. Because the 
TAX model is specifically inspired by event-spreading effects it may be expected to yield better 
predictions than CPT for choices that involve event-spreading. However, the TAX model only 
predicts 42% of the choices correctly whereas the CPT model correctly predicts 75% (using the 
functions and parameter values suggested respectively by Birnbaum and Navarette, 1998, and 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
3.2 Robustness o f event-spreading effects
Related to the size of the effect is the question of the robustness of event-spreading effects. 
Although modal choice obeys dominance, event-spreading can lead to remarkable rates of 
violations when applied efficiently. However, small variations may alter this proportion sig­
nificantly. First, our experiment shows that there is a significant learning effect. After exposure 
to several choices which involve dominance the violation rate drops. It seems that when
94
Event-spreading Effects
subjects recognize dominance they do not violate it, and the experiment reveals that it only takes 
some exposure to choices with a dominance structure to accomplish recognition. Second, our 
results show that the effects of event-spreading are not robust to changes of display. In the 
most transparent display that was used (area), the rate drops significantly. The most important 
result of our experiment concerning the robustness of the event-spreading effect is that the 
generalized spreading hypothesis proves to be false. That is, if events are spread into more than 
two outcomes, the effects are significantly smaller than when an event is spread into only two 
outcomes. Repeated application of event-spreading eliminates some of its own effect. This 
implies that the remarkable effects of event-spreading can be expected only for very specific 
choices.
When it concerns modeling choice, the question of robustness is even more important than 
the size of an effect. For example, the Allais paradox is famous for introducing a combination 
of choices that violates EU, but the reported proportions of violations are not that impressive 
(MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979). However, the certainty effect that causes these violations of 
EU is very robust. Subjects show no 'learning' effect when instructed with arguments compat­
ible with EU (Slovic & Tversky, 1974). The effect also does not disappear when displays are 
used that highlight the sure-thing principle (Li, 1994). Most important, the certainty effect 
produces predictable violations of EU in all kinds of choice problems testing the sure-thing 
principle (e.g. common ratio problems) (Camerer, 1995). Because these violations of EU are 
very robust almost all researchers accept that descriptive (contrary to normative) models should 
accommodate violations of the sure-thing principle (Edwards, 1992).
Besides a lack of robustness, other problems also show that event-spreading effects are 
elusive. Any model that serves to predict event-spreading necessarily violates coalescing (Luce, 
1997) and must therefore be able to distinguish all events of a gamble and not just the 
distribution on the outcomes. For example, when subjects are presented with a figure illustrat­
ing five marbles, four marbles labeled $0 and one labeled $100, it seems evident that this 
should be interpreted as a gamble with five distinct events. A gamble described as a .8 prob­
ability to win $0 and a .2 probability to win $100 should be interpreted as a gamble with just 
two distinct events. Any non-trivial theory that violates coalescing predicts a preference be­
tween these two gambles which seems dubious empirically. Also, suppose that both descrip­
tions are given presenting the gamble at hand, how many events should be used in the model? 
These considerations all add to the impression that the effects of event-spreading are not robust 
but depend to a large degree on context.
3.3 Event-spreading as a confounding variable
Even if event-spreading is lacking robustness, it is still important to have detailed knowledge of 
this phenomenon. Besides having intrinsic value it is also useful in bolstering experimental 
designs. Starmer and Sugden (1993) demonstrate that previous designs confounded event­
splitting effects with juxtaposition. Another illustration of a design where event-spreading may
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have been a confounding variable is Wu and Gonzalez (1996). To find evidence concerning the 
shape of the probability weighting function they used a design where the sure-thing principle is 
tested similar to the test of the CSTP in our experiment. Subjects are presented with choices 
where common outcomes are changed, for example: R 1 = (.03, $320) vs. S1 = (.05, $200) and 
R 2 = (03 , $320; .1, $200) vs. S2 = (.15, $200). The percentage of choices for the risky 
option R increases from 41% for R 1 to 61% for R2. Rank-dependent models can explain a 
preference shift in this direction if the weighting function is concave for small p as suggested 
by CPT. An alternative explanation can be given by event-spreading because changing the 
common outcome does not favor both gambles equally with respect to their attractiveness. The 
.1 probability to receive $200 enhances R2 more than S2 because it introduces a second large 
outcome, which is not the case for S2. If the event-spreading effect had been well known, a 
design that controlled for event-spreading effects might have been used, for example a change 
of common outcome from $0 to $190 instead of $200.
3.4 Explaining event-spreading effects
The main thrust of our argument so far is that event-spreading has significant effects on pref­
erences but a lack of robustness prevents event-spreading to be well accommodated by decision 
models. Event-spreading effects nevertheless lead to important insights into the modeling of 
preferences. Whereas the lack of robustness may be ground for dismissing event-spreading as 
part of decision models, it also implies that preferences are just not that stable, which may 
undermine the whole idea of modeling choice. When reviewing event-spreading effects it 
appears that decision making is a flexible process that does not agree with the rigor of 
maximization rules. This conclusion is not inspired solely by the effects of event-spreading but 
corroborates the conclusion based on well studied phenomena such as preference reversals (cf. 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983) and framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Other studies 
also show that preferences are affected by inconsequential context factors and so, point at the 
plasticity of the human decision process (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1992) which view is also 
reinforced when the explanation of event-spreading effects is inspected.
Event-spreading effects are for a large part self-explanatory. That is, subjects appear to 
judge gambles according to their attractiveness and gambles can appear attractive when they 
feature several large outcomes even if the probabilities are small. Event-spreading effects 
suggest that outcomes are not sufficiently traded off with probability. Some of the results re­
ported here suggest that other well-known phenomena also contribute to the explanation. First, 
scale compatibility (Tversky, Sattath & Slovic, 1988) may partly explain the new kind of 
preference reversals, where a dominated gamble is preferred in the matching task, but the 
dominant gamble is chosen. Scale compatibility suggests that when subjects have to match 
gambles with an amount of money, the outcomes will be the primary dimension on which the 
gambles are evaluated (Tversky, Slovic & Kahneman, 1990). Because the dominated gamble is 
enhanced in just that respect in our context, scale compatibility suggests that violations of
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dominance will be more prevalent in matching than in direct choice, as was indeed found. A 
second part of the explanation of preference reversals is that in choice the alternative option may 
be used as a contrast. Subjects will try to find a reason for choosing one gamble rather than the 
other by comparing both (Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, 1993). If dominance is detected, this 
will provide a good reason to choose the dominant gamble, which suggests that the rate of 
violations of dominance will be lower in direct choice than in matching, where no comparison 
can be made.
That alternatives are used as contrasts also explains some other results. First, it explains 
the display effects. Displays were varied specifically to make the dominance structure more 
transparent, which presupposes a comparison between both alternatives. This manipulation in­
deed shows a significant effect on the violation rate of dominance in direct choice. However, 
there was no effect of display on the violation rates based on certainty equivalents, which is 
precisely as predicted by the contrasting alternative explanation. Second, the prevalence of 
intransitive choice can also be explained as contrasting effects. Differences in the transparency 
of dominance causes violations of transitivity, which presupposes that alternatives are used as 
contrasts. That is, when both the large outcome of the dominated gamble and the small outcome 
of the dominant gamble are spread (i.e. X-  vs. X+), dominance may go undetected when 
gambles are compared. If  only one of the spreads occurs (i.e. X+ vs. X or X vs. X-  ), 
dominance is more transparent and may be detected more easily. Combined, this leads to 
intransitive choice. Furthermore, it seems that violations of transitivity always involve con­
trasting effects (Tversky, 1969; Starmer & Sugden, 1993; Bierman, 1989). It is obvious that 
subjects arrive at a decision by comparing gambles, but almost all current models (for example 
EU, CPT, TAX) are maximization models, which excludes that the evaluation of a gamble 
depends on the alternative.
3.5 Event-spreading effects as subadditive evaluation
In discussing event-spreading effects it has been taken for granted that when, for example, a 
large outcome is spread, the attractiveness of the gamble is enhanced. This appears to be self- 
evident, but it is also reminiscent of the psychological phenomenon of diminishing sensitivity 
that seems to be a recurrent theme in explaining decisions. Diminishing sensitivity implies that 
subjects are sensitive to changes near a natural boundary, but are less sensitive to identical 
changes that are farther away from this boundary. This is a very well known fact for the 
perception of physical stimuli, but its effects can also be traced in many aspects of decision 
making. It can be said, for example, that CPT models diminishing sensitivity. The value 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses, as implied by diminishing sensitivity 
(Fennema & van Assen, 1998). It also inspires the inverse S-shaped weighting function 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For probabilities there are two natural boundaries, zero and 
unity. Diminishing sensitivity implies that subjects are more sensitive for changes near zero 
than farther away from it (i.e. a change from 0% to 1% carries more weight than a change from
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11% to 12%), implying a function that is concave near zero. Unity is the second natural 
boundary where subjects will be more sensitive, so here diminishing sensitivity suggests a 
convex region of the weighting function.
Diminishing sensitivity explains event-spreading in that it implies a subadditive evaluation. 
That is, if  a quantity is divided, diminishing sensitivity implies that the sum of the evaluated 
parts will be larger than the evaluation of the original quantity. Therefore, if  an event yielding a 
large outcome is spread, the sum of the evaluation of the parts will exceed the evaluation of the 
original event. Many other parts related to decision making reveal similar subadditive 
evaluations. For riskless decision, subjects evaluate the pleasure of receiving gains and losses 
in a subadditive fashion (Thaler, 1985). Evaluation of the likelihood of events is also 
subadditive (Tversky & Koehler, 1994, Tversky & Fox, 1995, Fox, Rogers & Tversky, 
1996).
3.6 Conclusion
The human decision process seems to be flexible which may be its strength in many respects, 
but which renders the endeavor of modeling it complex. Event-spreading effects are not a good 
reason to abandon EU-based models but do add to the insight that precise mathematical models 
of preferences are merely an approximation, that is bound to fail in many aspects. Knowledge 
of the process that leads to choices may not always lead to an improvement of existing models, 
but does improve our understanding of decision making.
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N otes
1 Percentages were calculated by excluding preferences of subjects favoring the display they were familiar with.
2 An additional assumption that has to be made is that choice is transitive, which also may have been violated. 
The design of the experiment does not test this alternative explanation. Because scale compatibility (Tversky, 
Slovic & Sattath, 1988) and contrasting alternatives are plausible candidates to explain violations of procedural 
invariance (as will be argued in the discussion) the alternative explanation of intransitivity is ignored.
When certainty equivalents were equal they were not taken into account. This occurred in 25% of the cases, 
with little variation across comparisons.
For all 5 items in the experiment the TAX model as defined predicted the pattern X-  f  X f  X+
In the questions that were tested the average level of risk aversion varied from 24% to 59%. This difference had 
no effect on the proportions of changes of preference.
Some of the results are from a similar experiment conducted at the University of Nijmegen, where 118 under­
graduate students participated for a fee of 12,50 (about $1.25) answering 18 questions that were displayed either 
in a ®ord display or a display where probability was displayed with bars. There were no significant differences 
between these displays. Reported results are averages of relevant items across experiments.
The weighting function w can model this shift if w(.13)-w(.03) > w(.15)-w(.05).
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Summary
The main topic of this thesis is modeling of decision under risk and uncertainty through models 
that allow transforming of probabilities. The thesis consists of five independent chapters that 
consider properties and tests of such models, in particular of rank-dependent utility. These 
chapters are introduced and linked together in the first chapter, which also presents a short 
historical background to decision making.
Chapter 2 considers an axiomatization of a rank-dependent model that allows the over­
weighting of decumulative probabilities (i.e., that yield $x or more) smaller than p  and the si­
multaneous underweighting of decumulative probabilities larger than p. It is argued that this 
inverse S-shaped weighting function may characterize the buying of popular lotteries, that 
typically give a very small probability to win a large prize and a moderate chance to win smaller 
prizes. Also, recent developments in decision making that add to our understanding of the 
buying of lotteries (i.e. loss aversion, scale compatibility, the role of utility) are discussed.
Chapter 3 discusses differences between prospect theory and its successor cumulative 
prospect theory. It shows that cumulative prospect theory is not merely a formal correction of 
some theoretical problems in prospect theory, but it also gives different predictions. Some 
experiments by Lola Lopes are re-analyzed, and are demonstrated to favor cumulative prospect 
theory over prospect theory. It turns out that the rank-dependent transformation of probabilities 
of cumulative prospect theory is well suited for modeling the psychological phenomenon of 
diminishing sensitivity.
Chapter 4 investigates the descriptive performance of rank-dependent utility in the context 
of choice under ambiguity. Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily 
concentrated on decision under risk ("probability triangles"). The literature suggests, however, 
that ambiguity is one of the main causes for deviations from expected utility . The precise 
axiomatic difference between rank-dependent utility and expected utility is used in a critical test 
of both models. Surprisingly, the rank-dependent model does not provide any descriptive 
improvement over expected utility. Our data suggest other, "framing," factors that do provide 
descriptive improvements over expected utility.
Chapter 5 investigates the shape of the utility function for losses. From a rational point of 
view it can be argued that utility should be concave. Empirically, measurements of the utility 
for losses show mixed results but most evidence supports convex rather than concave utilities. 
However, these measurements use methods that are either biased by the certainty effect or 
require complex parametrical estimations. This chapter re-examines utility for losses, avoiding 
the mentioned pitfalls by using the tradeoff method. We find that utility for losses is convex.
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This is contrary to common assumption in the economics literature. Also, we investigate prop­
erties of the tradeoff method showing a new violation of procedure invariance. Our findings 
demonstrate that diminishing sensitivity is an important phenomenon for utility elicitation.
Chapter 6 estimates the size of event-spreading effects and evaluates explanations and 
proposals to model these effects. An event is said to be 'spread' when it is divided into several 
other events that yield similar outcomes as the original event. The event-spreading effect im­
plies that when the original outcome is relatively favorable (unfavorable) the attractiveness of 
the gamble is increased (decreased). Experiments are reported showing that event-spreading 
can be used to generate violations of dominance, transitivity, the comonotonic sure-thing 
principle and presentation and procedural invariance. Whereas event-spreading effects are pre­
dictable under special conditions, minor manipulations may lessen these effects significantly. 
Although event-spreading effects may not be robust enough to justify adjustments of decision 
models, detailed knowledge of these effects remains important to understand specific violations 
of expected utility theory and to guard against confounding effects in choice experiments.
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Als een persoon van twee loterijen, bijvoorbeeld 140 met zekerheid en 1100 met 50% kans (an­
ders niets), aan moet geven welke hij het liefst (eenmalig) zou willen spelen, dan observeren 
we keuzegedrag. De overkoepelende vraag van dit proefschrift is hoe dergelijk gedrag te be­
schrijven.
Het uitgangspunt van de hedendaagse besliskunde is Expected Utility (EU), dat ontstaan 
is als normatief model. De belangrijkste karakteristiek van EU is dat de evaluatie van kansen li­
neair is, maar de evaluatie van geld niet per se. De klassieke rationale hiervoor is dat naarmate 
je rijker wordt de toegevoegde waarde van geld afneemt (diminishing marginal utility). Later is 
dit model geaxiomatiseerd (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), wat inhoudt dat er een aantal 
intutief zeer plausibele regels voor preferenties te geven zijn die EU impliceren (Hoofdstuk 1).
Keuze is echter een cognitieve taak waarbij psychologische factoren een rol spelen die niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs conform dergelijke normatieve regels zijn. Een fenomeen dat met name een 
rol lijkt te spelen bij keuzegedrag is diminishing sensitivity, naarmate een stimulus verder van 
het natuurlijke referentiepunt verwijderd is, neemt de gevoeligheid van onze waarneming voor 
verandering af. Dit geldt voor fysische stimuli zoals geluid, maar is ook toepasbaar op de eva­
luatie van bedragen: het verschil tussen 1110 en 1120 is even groot als het verschil tussen Ÿ 0 
en 120, maar het wordt toch als een kleiner verschil ervaren.
Ditzelfde fenomeen lijkt zich voor te doen bij de evaluatie van kansen. Het verschil tussen 
een kans van 1% op de hoofdprijs en een van 0% wordt als een interessant verschil ervaren, 
maar het verschil tussen 33% en 34% kans op dezelfde prijs als veel minder interessant. Het 
verschil tussen 99% en 100% kans op deze prijs is echter juist wel weer boeiend. In termen van 
diminishing sensitivity is er sprake van twee natuurlijke referentiepunten: onmogelijkheid (kans 
van 0) en zekerheid (kans van 1). Dicht bij deze referentiepunten lijken mensen 'gevoeliger' 
voor veranderingen dan verder hiervan verwijderd, hetgeen niet strookt met de lineaire evaluatie 
van kansen binnen EU.
Het centrale alternatieve model in dit proefschrift is Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU) dat 
niet-lineaire evaluatie van kansen toestaat. Dit model introduceert beslisgewichten, die verkre­
gen worden als verschillen van getransformeerde decumulatieve kansen, oftewel kansen op het 
verkrijgen van 1x o f meer. In het voorbeeld hierboven krijgt het verschil van 1% kans daardoor 
verschillende beslisgewichten, respectievelijk een gewicht van w(.01)w(0),w(.34)w(.33) en 
w(1)w(.99). Merk op dat deze gewichten verschillend zijn doordat de rang van de uitkomsten 
verschillend zijn. De eerste procent op de hoofdprijs introduceert de beste uitkomst. Als je al 33 
procent kans op de hoofdprijs hebt dan introduceert een additionele procent kans een 'midden'
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uitkomst. Als je 99% procent kans hebt op de hoofdprijs dan heft de additionele procent kans 
de 'slechtste' uitkomst op. De vorm van de weegfunctie biedt daardoor de mogelijkheid om be­
paalde typen keuzegedrag te modelleren. Zo modelleert de figuur op het kaft het hierboven 
beschreven fenomeen van diminishing sensitivity, waarbij beslisgewichten van extreme uit­
komsten (zowel gunstige als ongunstige) relatief hoog zijn. Een andere mogelijkheid is het mo­
delleren van pessimistisch gedrag door een convexe weegfunctie: kansen op ongunstige uit­
komsten worden dan verwogen terwijl kansen op gunstige uitkomsten worden onderwogen.
In het tweede hoofdstuk wordt RDU gentroduceerd als een model dat in tegenstelling tot 
EU zou kunnen verklaren waarom sommige typen loterijen aantrekkelijker worden gevonden 
dan andere. In het typische geval heeft een aantrekkelijke loterij een erg kleine kans op n 
hoofdprijs, gecombineerd met een aantal kleinere prijzen. Een typisch onaantrekkelijke loterij 
biedt voor Ÿ5 een 70% kans op een prijs van 1100. In RDU met een (omgekeerd) S-vormige 
weegfunctie krijgt de hoofdprijs een relatief hoog beslisgewicht (de kans op winnen wordt 
overschat) hetgeen verklaart waarom er in een typisch populaire loterij slechts n hoofdprijs is 
met een zeer lage kans. Omdat de iets minder extreme prijzen ook relatief hoge beslisgewichten 
krijgen, bevordert een beperkt aantal kleinere prijzen ook de aantrekkelijkheid. Een kans van 
70% op de meest gunstige uitkomst kan echter worden onderwogen in het RDU model, wat 
verklaart waarom deze loterij onaantrekkelijk is. Het hoofdstuk biedt naast een axiomatisatie 
van RDU met een (omgekeerd) S-vormige curve een bespreking van een aantal recente ontwik­
kelingen in de besliskunde welke de populariteit van specifieke loterijen verder verklaren.
Het derde hoofdstuk vergelijkt twee modellen die op een verschillende wijze kansen trans­
formeren. In Prospect Theorie worden (in principe) vaste kansen vervormd: een kans van .05 
wordt altijd vervormd naar hetzelfde beslisgewicht. De opvolger van deze theorie, Cumulatieve 
Prospect Theorie, vervormt kansen rang-afhankelijk (een vorm van RDU). Het voordeel van 
rang-afhankelijk vervormen van kansen is in de eerste plaats theoretisch. Als rang-afhankelijke 
kansen getransformeerd worden dan voldoet het model aan dominantie, hetgeen inhoudt dat 
voorspeld wordt dat een loterij die altijd meer oplevert dan een andere loterij ook altijd 
geprefereerd wordt. Een ander theoretisch voordeel is dat de uitbreiding naar een model met een 
groot aantal verschillende uitkomsten geen problemen oplevert. Centraal in dit hoofdstuk staat 
echter de empirische vraag of de nieuwe vorm van kanstransformatie ook zorgt voor betere 
voorspellingen. Neem als voorbeeld een loterij met 21 lootjes, drie voor elk van de prijzen 
1300, 1200, 1100, 0, 1100, 1200 en 1300. De vraag is welk lootje je  het liefst n 
categorie zou willen doorschuiven, wat bijvoorbeeld resulteert in een loterij met 4 kansen op 0 
en slechts 2 kansen op 1100. Hierbij blijkt dat de predicties van beide modellen verschillen en 
dat het rang-afhankelijke model (met een 'diminishing sensitivity' weegfunctie) betere voor­
spellingen doet, zoals de relatieve populariteit van het reduceren van de kans op 1300 en het 
verhogen van de kans op 1300.
De indruk op basis van de eerste drie hoofdstukken is dat het transformeren van kansen op 
een rang-afhankelijke wijze zowel theoretisch als empirisch tot een verbetering leidt ten opzichte
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van EU. Echter, omdat RDU minder restricties op de data legt zal RDU altijd minstens even 
goed keuzes voorspellen als EU. Er zal dus een afweging gemaakt moeten worden of deze con­
cessie voldoende predictieve winst oplevert. De meest kritische manier om deze afweging te 
maken baseert zich op het precieze, axiomatische verschil tussen RDU en EU. In het vierde 
hoofdstuk wordt RDU aan deze test onderworpen voor loterijen waarbij de kansen op de ver­
schillende gebeurtenissen onbekend zijn, hetgeen een rang-afhankelijke evaluatie zou kunnen 
bevorderen vanwege de toegenomen onzekerheid. Uit het experiment blijkt echter geen enkel 
verschil tussen het relatieve aantal schendingen van RDU en EU; het lijkt er dus op dat in het al­
gemene geval RDU primair predictieve winst levert door een grotere vrijheid bij het modelleren 
en niet omdat rang-afhankelijke transformatie een systematische eigenschap van het keuzepro­
ces modelleert. Ogenschijnlijk onbelangrijke variaties in de presentatie van de keuzeproblemen 
leveren echter wel een significant effect op keuzegedrag; of een tweetal verschillende gebeurte­
nissen met identieke uitkomsten gecombineerd of juist niet gecombineerd gepresenteerd worden 
benvloedt keuze. De conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dan ook niet erg positief voor RDU, waar­
bij wel het voorbehoud gemaakt moet worden dat specifieke omstandigheden van het experi­
ment verantwoordelijk kunnen zijn geweest voor het niet vinden van evidentie voor rang-af- 
hankelijk transformeren van kansen.
In het vijfde hoofdstuk staat de vorm van de utiliteit (evaluatie van geld) voor verliesbedra­
gen centraal. Volgens economen wordt geld meer waard naarmate je er minder van hebt, het­
geen betekent dat de utiliteit concaaf zou moeten zijn. Echter, diminishing sensitivity voor geld­
bedragen impliceert voor verliezen het omgekeerde: het verschil tussen 180 en 1100 wordt 
als minder belangwekkend ervaren dan het verschil tussen 10 en 120, hetgeen een convexe 
utiliteit voorspelt. Om deze vraag goed te kunnen beantwoorden moet echter gewaarborgd wor­
den dat het (mogelijkerwijs) vervormen van kansen geen invloed heeft op de meting van utili­
teit. Gebruik makend van een methode die precies de rol van kansvervorming uitsluit, de tra­
deoff methode, blijkt experimenteel dat utiliteit voor verliezen overwegend convex is, zoals 
voorspeld door diminishing sensitivity. Een nevenresultaat van het experiment is dat theoretisch 
equivalente methodes om utiliteit te meten (de inward  en outward tradeoff procedures) 
verschillende resultaten leveren. Waar in het vorige hoofdstuk de presentatie van keuzeproble­
men een effect had op gedrag blijkt dat ook de toegepaste methode een niet onaanzienlijk effect 
op keuzegedrag heeft. Hoewel de hoofdconclusie dat de convexiteit van de utiliteit voor ver­
liesbedragen robuust is, blijkt wel dat het concept 'meten' bij utiliteit toch enigszins misleidend 
is. Hoe de utiliteit er uit ziet is niet onafhankelijk van de meting, maar hangt af van de gestelde 
taak en de specifieke psychologische mechanismen die een rol spelen bij het uitvoeren van deze 
taak.
In het zesde hoofdstuk staat het effect van de presentatie van een loterij op keuzegedrag 
centraal. Het blijkt dat als de kans op een gunstige uitkomst 'verspreid' wordt over een aantal 
vergelijkbare uitkomsten, de aantrekkelijkheid van een loterij toeneemt (en afneemt als de oor­
spronkelijke uitkomst relatief ongunstig is). Dit kan leiden tot opmerkelijk keuzegedrag zoals
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gellustreerd wordt in onderstaande figuur. Loterij A wordt verkregen door de gunstige uit­
komst van de 'constructie' loterij te spreiden. Loterij B wordt verkregen door de ongunstige 
uitkomst te spreiden. Het netto resultaat is dat A er 'aantrekkelijker' uitziet dan B, terwijl B al­
tijd even veel of meer oplevert dan A ('domineert'). In termen van de gangbare keuzemodellen 
(EU, RDU) zou een dergelijke manipulatie echter amper effect op keuzegedrag mogen hebben 
(en in dit geval in de tegengestelde richting).
35% kans op Ÿ0 ...  1 ^ 30% kans op Ÿ0
35% kans op Ÿ0
10% kans op Ÿ60 1 5% kans op Ÿ5
65% kans op Ÿ65
55% kans op Ÿ65 --------------------------------------------------------• 65% kans op 6^5
Loterij A 'constructie' loterij Loterij B
Uit het experiment blijkt echter duidelijk dat het spreiden van uitkomsten kan leiden tot op­
merkelijk hoge percentages schendingen van allerlei rationele principes, waarbij wel enig voor­
behoud gemaakt dient te worden. Het effect is niet bijzonder groot en, belangrijker, het is niet 
erg robuust. Variaties in presentatie en elicitatiemethode benvloeden het effect en bovendien 
wordt het niet groter (maar zelfs kleiner) als een uitkomst over meer dan twee uitkomsten ge­
spreid wordt. Het experiment geeft echter wederom een duidelijke indicatie dat keuzegedrag 
door meer dan de distributie van kansen over bedragen wordt bepaald.
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat het psychologische proces dat leidt tot een keuze 
uitermate flexibel is, wat enerzijds een groot pluspunt is maar anderzijds ook inhoudt dat keuze 
afhankelijk is van normatief irrelevante variaties in de manier van presentatie en elicitatie. Hoe­
wel RDU op een elegante wijze bepaald systematisch vertoond keuzegedrag kan voorspellen 
blijft het uiteindelijk slechts een benadering die op haar beurt weer op voorspelbare en onvoor­
spelbare wijze geschonden wordt. Hoewel systematische studie van keuzegedrag niet noodza­
kelijkerwijs leidt tot een verbetering van de bestaande modellen, bevordert het wel het begrip 
van het keuzeproces.
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